

The Emergent Hierarchy: An Evolutionary Recasting of Neoplatonic Polytheism¹

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*Religion will not regain its old power until it can face
change in the same spirit as does science.²*

—Alfred North Whitehead

Introduction

This is a paper in the philosophy of religion, which draws upon a rich network of cross-connections between Classical Neoplatonism, archetypal psychology, and evolutionary neurotheology. The paper's thesis is that the Aristotelian reversal of the top-down, Neoplatonic vector of ontological dependency found in the writings of Bruce MacLennan serve as a foundation to rework Neoplatonic metaphysics and theurgy into forms which are rooted in the principle of emergence, rather than emanation, and thus arrives at an understanding of polytheistic theology which is not only compatible with, but fundamentally tied to, the process of evolution. This argument is explored in turn by first examining the essentialism and emanationism that originates with Plato. This train is then followed forward several hundred years to Plato's commentator, Plotinus, who developed Platonic philosophy into the four-tiered hierarchy of Neoplatonism. This treatment of the Classical Neoplatonists is rounded out with a review of Iamblichus, for his expansion of Plotinus's emanative scheme and insistence on the primacy of theurgic praxis. We then leap forward more than a thousand years to the psychology of Carl Jung, whose theories of the archetypes of the collective unconscious are shown to be a modernization of Neoplatonic metaphysics and theology. The paper then turns to the contemporary work of Bruce MacLennan, who analyzes this correlation between Neoplatonism and Jungianism in light of recent developments in evolutionary neurotheology and the emergent Aristotelian response to

1 This paper, minus the final, "Epistle to the Heathen," section was submitted as the author's BA thesis in the American Military University's philosophy program. It draws on two previously written papers: "The Hierarchical Cosmos: Occult Theology as a Direct Continuation of Neoplatonism" (to be published in the forthcoming *Occult Traditions* volume of the *Primordial Traditions* book series) and "The Ubiquity of Prehension: Panpsychism as a Solution to the Mind-Body Problem" (to be published in the second volume of *KannenBright: Concordia University Undergraduate Journal of Theological Studies*).

2 Alfred North Whitehead, "Religion and Science," *The Atlantic*, August 1925.

Plato's emanative essentialism. Finally, the paper, building upon MacLennan's reformulation of the core Neoplatonic process of contingency—which he principally explores in terms of the relationship between mankind and the Gods—extrapolates this Aristotelian recasting into a complete philosophical picture, which takes into account the effect that this reformulation has on the constitution of and interrelations between all levels of the metaphysical hierarchy. The resultant structure is one which presents a view that necessarily entails a panexperientialist foundational ontology, a series of polytheistic middle layers, and a culminating panentheistic vision of the whole—all of which is driven in a bottom-up manner by the principles of evolution and emergence.

As this work is principally a critique of two of Neoplatonism's core ideas, it befits us to begin with definitions of these two terms and a foray into their genesis. The first point to be made is that the fundamental orientation of Neoplatonic metaphysics can be characterized as *top-down* in nature.³ A quick way to explain this is to do so in contrast with modern physics, whose orientation is thoroughly *bottom-up*. So, although contemporary physics and Neoplatonism both begin with the layer of reality that presents itself to the senses and both have in common a predisposition to produce theories which conceive of that layer as being one of many, each mode of investigation operates from a different pole. The physicist, seeing the ultimate causes of perceptible phenomena in the increasingly miniscule and atomized layers below (e.g. bodies are composed of cells, which are composed of molecules, which are composed of atoms, etc.) “proceeds ‘downwards’ by penetrating the subtleties of material or physical structures of the universe.”⁴ His orientation begins with the ultimate at the *bottom* of the cosmic hierarchy and proceeds *upwards* in the eventual constitution of every day objects; thus, we call this a *bottom-up* kind of metaphysics. In contrast, the Neoplatonist sees the material world as a whole, and views it as the *end* of a chain of contingency whose ultimate source sits far *above* the sensible world. For the Neoplatonist, the world of matter is conceived of as being the final result of a *downwardly* directed process, and is thus referred to as a *top-down* metaphysical model.

While the idea of this differentiation in the constitutive vector is indeed reversed between these two schools of thought, there is another key difference between the way in which top-down and bottom-up models treat the successive layers as being formed. Being our default metaphysical model, we understand the physical-

3 Pauliina Remes, *Neoplatonism*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), viii.

4 Ibid., ix.

ist position that we begin with a bottom layer of *some* sort of atomized⁵ sub-atomic particle, and from there simply build up larger structures by putting together particles like a child puts together Lego blocks. The Neoplatonist, had a completely different conception of what process led to the current state of the material world as we experience it. Since the kind of constructivism that the “building block” model presents is fundamentally bottom-up, the top-down metaphysics of the Neoplatonists necessarily explains things in vastly different terms. The particular word used to describe the way in which the hierarchies in the Neoplatonic cosmos are constituted has become known as *emanation*. In brief, this doctrine can be summed up as the principle that the universe has a single originating source, and that this source is “the most perfect thing we can imagine since there is no cause ‘above’ it. This one cause would generate something else by the necessity of its perfection, and the generated thing would be inferior to it.”⁶ This process then repeats at each level below the source, with each emanating layer being a poorer reflection of the one upon which it is contingent. At each layer the universality and singularity of the source decreases, and particularity and multiplicity become more strongly manifested. This process continues until the bottom of the hierarchy is finally reached: the material world.

Platonic Roots

Any treatment of Neoplatonism must begin with, at the minimum, a brief exploration of the formational system upon which it is largely a hermeneutic: Platonism. While a full treatment of Plato’s philosophy would extend far beyond the boundaries imposed by this paper’s size and scope, it is incumbent upon us to examine how the aforementioned principles of top-downism and emanationism originated—and their origins lie with Plato (428–348 BC). Both concepts are inseparable from Plato’s doctrine of the Forms, making it a necessary point of reference in the present investigation of Neoplatonism. The English word “Form” (generally capitalized in connection with Plato) is used to translate two terms which Plato used for the same concept: *eidos* (εἶδος—“that which is seen,” “form,” “shape,” or “figure”) and *idea* (ιδέα—“the *look* of a thing, as opposed to its reality”).⁷ The theory of Forms is outlined most clearly in the *Republic*, where

5 Unless referring to the proper atoms of modern physics, any use of terms derived from this root (e.g. atomic, atomized, etc.) refer to the principle of discrete, indivisible units of substance called *atomos* (ἄτομος—“uncut, unmown, indivisible”) by Leucippus and Democritus. As a further note, all Greek orthographic and etymological notes are derived from Liddell and Scott’s *Greek-English Lexicon*, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

6 Remes, 44.

7 Frederick Copleston, *Greece and Rome*, vol. 1 of *A History of Philosophy*, (London: Search Press, 1946), 164.

Plato demonstrates his theory as a solution to the problem of universals.⁸ To do so, he takes the example of a bed. The bed made by a carpenter, Plato argues, is “only *a* bed;” it is a particular instance of something that we recognize as belonging to the overarching type of phenomenon called Bed.⁹ The particular bed of the carpenter is however “a somewhat dark affair in comparison to the true” Form of the Bed.¹⁰ What he means by this is that the Form of an object is the perfect, universal—the bedness that makes the discrete bed recognizable as such—of which instantiated particulars are but an imperfect reflection. This is the root of the principle of emanation, of the notion that the sensory world of phenomena is the lower tier of a dyadic cosmos—a level of existence in which the plurality of instantiation radiates forth from a unity of conception. Each Form is a monadic unity; its nature is singular. All plurality that exists in the perceptible world is due to the reflective emanation of the Form as it shines from the upper level down into the lower. It is as if each Form were a star. The star casts light that is reflected in a myriad of imperfect ways as it penetrates the atmosphere. Yet these disparate reflections are all manifestations of *one* perfect source: the Form. Thus, under Plato’s system the *essence* of the thing being considered is ontologically prior to the existence of the thing itself. This top-down orientation of Platonic metaphysics is the source of the Neoplatonic postulations that reality is both *layered* and that the vector of ontological dependence which leads from the upper to the lower is *unidirectional*.

A second element of Plato’s thought that needs examining in order for the Neoplatonic hermeneutics to be brought into the proper context is that of the demiurge (δημιουργός—“one who works for the people,” “framer,” or “maker”). This term was, in Plato’s day, commonly used to refer to craftsmen and artisans. In the dialogue *Timaeus*, the demiurge is described as “he who framed this whole universe of becoming.”¹¹ If all existent phenomena are the resultants of pro-

8 Roughly speaking, the problem of universals concerns the relationship between universals (e.g. the idea of redness) and particulars (e.g. concrete instances of red). The Platonic position described above derives particulars from universals. Aristotle reversed this flow, positing that universals were dependent upon particulars. Both positions fall into the modern taxonomic grouping of *realism*, in that they both treat universals as being real in a metaphysical sense. In contrast to realism is *nominalism*, which treats universals as mere names for artificial groupings of phenomena (Michael J. Loux, *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*, 3rd ed., [New York: Routledge, 2010], 17–18, 41).

9 Plato, *Republic*, trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve, in *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997), 596e–597a.

10 Ibid., 597a.

11 Plato, *Timaeus*, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, in *Plato: Complete Works*, 29d–29e.

cesses which are contingent upon antecedent processes, it is natural to suppose that at the root of this causal chain is a singularity that is the uncaused first cause—a being Plato’s student Aristotle (384–322 BC) described so famously as the “unmoved mover” (οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ).¹² The demiurge then, acts as the prime rational cause that initiates the ordering of the chaos that Hesiod describes as existing prior to the shaping of things by the Gods.¹³ This notion of there being a *singular* source that *all* resultant order was contingent upon is the source of the One around which all Neoplatonic thinkers center their metaphysical hierarchies. The demiurge is distinct from the God of scholastic theism in a very important respect: he is not a creator *per se*, but is a shaper as the very word demiurge implies. The Greeks had no conception of *ex nihilo* creation. Something must always come from something else, there is no nothingness that exists apart from God; there is only the fluxating chaos that was ordered into actuality by the demiurge. Although in Plato’s metaphysical system, there is but *one* ordered layer of reality for the demiurge to shape, the Neoplatonists had no trouble transforming this to suit the increasing complexity of their cosmic manifold. Furthermore, Plato is somewhat ambiguous as to whether or not the demiurge is ontologically primary.¹⁴ Owing to this, the Neoplatonists who followed in his wake ascribed various upper levels of the celestial hierarchy to the demiurge, with some granting him the ultimate position of the One,¹⁵ and other relegating him to the penultimate role of the uncreated second emanation.¹⁶

Plotinian Metaphysics

After Plato’s death, there developed a dedicated tradition of exegetical and eise-

12 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* in *Introduction to Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon, (New York: The Modern Library, 1947), 285.

13 Hesiod, “The Theogony of Hesiod,” in *Hesiod, Homeric Hymns, Homeric Hymns*, trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 87.

14 “Ontological dependency is a relation—or, more accurately, a family of relations—between entities or *beings*,” as ontology (ὄντοζ—“that which is,” and -λογία—a suffix denoting the study of the preceding prefix”) is the study of *being* (E. Jonathan Lowe, “Ontological Dependence,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dependence-ontological/> [accessed May 27, 2011]). In such a system of relations, those things which *depend* upon other beings for their existence and/or identity. The antecedent being to which these beings are dependent is ontologically prior. That which is ontologically *primary* is that which depends upon nothing for its existence and is, through the chain of dependency, that upon which *all* depends.

15 Copleston, 476.

16 Ibid., 467.

getical hermeneutics centered around his dialogues.¹⁷ The full flowering of this interpretative tradition was realized in the philosophy of the Neoplatonists, a lineage of thinkers who flourished between the 3rd and 6th centuries throughout the Hellenistic world. Plotinus (204–270) was an Egyptian thinker whose “teaching and writings...form the backbone of Neoplatonic philosophy.”¹⁸ His writings, collected by his student Porphyry as the *Enneads*, detail the foundational doctrines of Neoplatonism. As principally a commentator on Plato, there is much in his thought that is shared in common with his antecedent, yet there is equally much innovation and development of root ideas found in Plotinus as well. The commonalities include:

1. That there is a first principle.
2. That there exists a plurality of metaphysical layers, each with corresponding entities.
3. The idea that “the metaphysically prior is always more powerful, better and more simple or unified than the metaphysically lower.”
4. That reality is permeated by mind and intelligibility.
5. That the perfection of the top of the hierarchy leads to an upwardly directed striving in those beneath.¹⁹

There are, however, numerous ways in which these common ideas were modified by the Neoplatonists. For the purposes of this paper, the most important distinctions are the differing ways in which Plato and Plotinus conceived of the layering of reality. Plotinus, and the Neoplatonists such as Porphyry (234–305 AD), Iamblichus (245–325 AD) and Proclus (412–487 AD) who followed him, adhered to a cosmology composed of four or more emanations. The original Plotinian system comprised of:

1. *To Hen*, The One (τό ἓν—“the one”)
2. *Nous*, The Intellect (νοῦς—“mind” or “perception”)
3. *Psuchē*, The Soul (ψυχή—“breath,” “life” or “spirit”)

17 Hermeneutics, from the Greek ἐρμηνεύω (*hermeneuō*—“translate” or “interpret”) is the art and practice of interpreting, among other things, texts. Within hermeneutics, two methodologies may be distinguished, ἐξήγησις (*exegesis*—“to lead out of”) and εἰσήγησις (*eisegesis*—“to lead out”). Exegetical hermeneutics pull their interpretation out of a text *from* cues that are within; the eisegetical mode of analysis interprets the text by applying externally formulated ideas *to* it (*An Introductory Dictionary of Theology and Religious Studies*, ed. Orlando Espin and James B. Nickoloff, [Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2007], c.v. “exegesis/eisegesis” and “hermeneutics”).

18 Remes, 19–21.

19 Ibid., 7–8.

4. *Phusis*, The Physical (φύσις—“the nature or natural qualities of a thing”)²⁰

The One²¹ is also identified by Plotinus as *theos* (θεός—“god, both in the general and particular sense”) and sits at the very top of the series of hypostases (ὑπόστασις—“that which settles at the bottom”), or emanations, that proceed downwards from it. In contrast to the Classical theists who would follow him, Plotinus did *not* identify the One with being. Indeed, Plotinus saw the One as transcendent *to* being; for, “being is varied and many, whereas the One is absolute simplicity, and hence is not among beings but beyond being.”²² The One is uncaused, like Plato and Aristotle’s demiurge. As Plotinus tells us, if it were itself caused by *anything* then it would not be the ultimate metaphysical category—and thus must be self-caused.²³ While Neoplatonic metaphysics *are* monistic in that the One is both the highest category *and* is the source of all emanations secondary, tertiary and quaternary to it, it is important to note that this is *not* the kind of illusory vision of plurality and temporality we find in the ontologies of the Eleatics such as Parmenides (5th century BC) or Zeno (ca. 490–430 BC). Rather, the descending levels of reality are *real*, but are generated by and contingent upon the levels immediately higher. Thus, the One does not *immediately* generate *all* levels beneath it, but births the layer directly under it, which in turn does the same, etc.²⁴

In dealing with the One, we witness the emergence of the earliest Western form of *panentheism*. As a theological theory of divine identity, it is best understood in context with the two other overarching theological positions: Classical theism and pantheism. Classical theism, we may say, is a grouping of theological positions which assert that God is “transcendent, self-sufficient, eternal, and immutable in relation to the world; thus he does not change through time and is not affected by relation to his creatures.”²⁵ This is distinguished from pantheism, which we shall define as the position “that God is identical with everything,” that deity is imminent, contingent, temporal and mutable in relation to the world, because the two are one and the same.²⁶ Seeing that these two theologies are

20 Ibid., 58.

21 For clarity’s sake, I have capitalized the emanations as proper nouns.

22 Remes, 49.

23 Plotinus, *Enneads* in *Neoplatonic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*, eds. John Dillon and Lloyd P. Gerson, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2004), 176.

24 Remes, 53.

25 John W. Cooper, *Panentheism: The Other God of the Philosophers*, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 14.

26 Robert Audi, ed., *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge:

wholly different in every respect, where does that leave panentheism? Panentheism positions itself as an intermediary view between the extremes of Classical theism and pantheism. It is distinguished from pantheism, linguistically, by the inclusion of the *-en* suffix,²⁷ which amounts to “the belief that...God includes and penetrates the whole universe, so that every part of it exists in Him.”²⁸ This leads us to treat panentheism as a theology which bridges several of the gaps existing between Classical theism and pantheism by affirming that God is at once immanent *and* transcendent—that he is in possession of attributes which are both eternal and temporal, immutable and mutable. “The One is both infinite and utterly transcendent, yet it includes or contains everything that emanates from it”²⁹ by means of all things which emanate from a higher level *participating*³⁰ in the higher layers.

Immediately emanating from the One is the Intellect, which is identified by Plotinus as the Platonic world of Forms.³¹ This secondary level of hypostasis is that of being.³² As mentioned earlier, in Neoplatonic metaphysics being emanates from the One, which is henologically prior to it.³³ The ideal world of the Intellect is characterized by a plurality of Forms, which are the “true or real beings” from which all material beings emanate.³⁴ In this regard, we may consider Neoplatonism to be in line with contemporary realism in that universals and ideas are

Cambridge University Press, 1999), s.v. “pantheism.”

27 The term *panentheism* is a Hellenization of a word coined by Karl Krause (1781–1832): *Allingottlehre*, both of which literally translate as “all-in-God-ism,” (Cooper, 26).

28 Frank L. Cross and Elizabeth A. Livingston, eds., *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, 3rd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 1213.

29 Cooper, 39.

30 Participation referring to the way in which lower layers are reflections of the upper. Just as a particular horse participates in horseness, so do all things participate in the One.

31 Plotinus, 74.

32 It should be noted that just as post-Plotinian philosophers disagreed on the placement of the Demiurge within the hierarchy, so did they disagree on whether Being occupied the first or second *hypostasis*. Plotinus and Porphyry adhered to the view described above, while Iamblichus and Proclus identified the One with being (Gregory Shaw, *Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus*, [University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995], 113).

33 Here we must use *henology* in place of *ontology*, as *ontos* (ὄντος—“being”) is not the ultimate category involved, with that honor going to *hen* (ἓν—“one”). As mentioned previously, ontological priority takes *being* as its foundational idea. If, as is the case with Plotinus, being itself is dependent upon yet *another* category, then we must phrase our terminology around that upon which being depends.

34 Remes, 54.

real metaphysical entities which exist independent from particular, instantiated conceptions of them in a mind.³⁵ However, just as the Neoplatonic schema differs in that it does not place the world of Forms as the ultimate metaphysical layer, it *also* differs in that it does not place the perceptible world directly beneath the Forms. In the Neoplatonic system there is a further, intermediary realm that affects the emanative transition from ideal to actual. In Classical Platonism there is, it seems, an abyss that yawns between the ideal Forms and the actual instantiations. Plotinus sought to naturalize this by positing a transitional layer betwixt the two.

This third level is that of the Soul.³⁶ As each hypostasis brings us closer to the human experience, it is unsurprising that the Soul level “even more emphatically than the Intellect sounds like something human.”³⁷ The Soul functions as an intermediary step between the atemporal realm of the Intellect and the wholly temporal Physical reality. Thus, while the Soul itself is not strictly temporal, it is the agent through which flux comes to be. The actions of the Soul create temporal succession and give this succession a directional vector that is responsible for producing the perception of time as a continuum in the fourth and final emanation.³⁸ As in so much of Greek thought, we find that ensoulment is *not* a particular feature that is limited to humanity. Rather than the kind of bifurcation between man and the world that humanism espouses, the Neoplatonists naturalized the *psuchē* and espoused a panpsychist³⁹ position in which Soul was participated in by *all*.⁴⁰ Furthermore, for Plotinus, the Soul was the animating principle that brought life to the inanimate forms. He saw life and change as being fundamentally entwined, which is why they both have their genesis in the same emanatory layer. The specific term for the agent of Neoplatonic panpsychism was the *psuchē kosmou* (ψυχὴ κόσμου—“world soul”).

As the panentheism that pervades Neoplatonism does not *necessarily* imply pansychism, a self-contained argument which demonstrated the continuity of the *psuchē* throughout the world was made. All that is required of a panpsychist position is that all individual things—at the lowest ontological level—possess

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., 55.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., 56.

39 Panpsychism, from the Greek roots *pan* (πᾶν—“all” or “everything”) and *psuchē* (ψυχή—“mind,” “breath,” or “spirit”) is the position that all things have a mind or mind-like quality. While for some schools of thought this quality is more specifically mental in nature, in the case of Neoplatonism, it is Soul.

40 David Skrbina, *Panpsychism in the West*, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007), 61.

some mind-like quality. Neither panentheism, pantheism or Classical theism necessitate that mind or soul pervade *all* levels of the cosmos. Neoplatonic panentheism would only *require* it at the level of the whole.⁴¹ Yet, in typical top-down fashion, we *begin* with the idea of a World Soul, and then proceed downwards to extrapolate this principle to the particulars who participate in this universal. The argument which seeks to demonstrate this all-pervading *psuchē* is found in Plato's *Philebus*.⁴² Roughly summarized, the argument proceeds as follows:

1. All material bodies—to include everything from insects, to humans, to the universe at large—are solely composed of the four elements.
2. Human material bodies are connected to higher level psychic forms.
3. The fact that the human body is composed of the four elements entails that it is in possession of a *psuchē*.
4. Therefore, the cosmos as a whole is in possession of the same—in the form of the World Soul.
5. And, since *psuchē* is “a general quality of objects composed of the four elements, one may conclude that...”
6. *Psuchē* is an attribute of *all* materiality.⁴³

Thus we can see, from this argument, a line of reasoning that allows for the participation of the material world in *psuchē* in two ways: both as individual atomic bits of matter, and as a cosmic whole. This hearkens back to the panentheism found in the topmost layer of the hierarchy in which the divinity exists both as a singular unity *and* as the unfolding series of emanations below. This dyadic mode of the constitution of metaphysical entities is something which rears its head continually in Neoplatonic thought, and will be particularly noticeable when we come around to the discussion of Iamblichean theology.

The fourth tier of the cosmic ladder is the Physical world of materiality and sense perception.⁴⁴ This world is the culmination of the emanative process. As such it demonstrates both the greatest unfolding of the potentiality of the One into actuality and at the same time is the farthest from the perfection of the One. While we are all too familiar with our experience of this level of reality, it will do much good at this point to step back and examine just how this emanative schema explains the experience of sensory phenomena in the final layer. Let us take as an example a brown horse that we witness running across a field.⁴⁵ The horse appears as a unified being that is able to be identified as such due to its participation

41 Ibid., 39.

42 Plato, *Philebus*, trans. Dorothea Frede, in *Plato*, 29a–30b.

43 This six-point breakdown of Plato's argument was formalized in Skrbina, 39.

44 Remes, 58.

45 This example is taken from Remes, 58–59.

in the principle of unity that is at the top of the metaphysical ladder: the One. Its *whatness*, that aspect of its intelligible structure that identifies it as participating in *horseness*, its being a reflection of the ideal Form of the Horse is owed to the second emanation: the Intellect. The horse is also *alive* and is driven by an internal impetus to strive onwards and persist in time as a being whose goal is to actualize its potentiality. This animating core is caused by the third layer: the Soul. Finally, we come back to our immediate experience of the *thatness* of this *particular* horse as an imperfect representative of the ideal Form that we hold in our minds of what a Horse really is. This horse before us has myriad imperfections: it limps slightly, its color is not as pure as it could be, etc. This is product of the culmination of the emanative process. The imperfect, temporal multiplicity that shines down from the perfected One.

Iamblichean Theology

Upon the foundation laid by Plotinus, Iamblichus—an Assyrian Neoplatonist who was a student of Plotinus’ protege and biographer Porphyry—greatly expanded the system to better incorporate and synthesize the religious *doxa* and *praxes*⁴⁶ of the Hellenic world. Where Plotinus’ metaphysics were *implicitly* pagan, yet focused almost exclusively on the unity of the One, Iamblichus’ were much more strongly polytheistic, placing great emphasis upon the differentiation within the medial layers of the cosmic hierarchy. Just as Thales before him,⁴⁷ Iamblichus’ world was one that teemed with Gods. Following the fourfold emanative cosmological scheme detailed above, Iamblichus presents us with a four-tiered theology to match:⁴⁸

1. Gods (θεοί)
2. Daimones (δαίμονες—“Gods, generally” or “the links between Gods and men”)
3. Heroes (ἥρωες—“inferior local deities” or “patrons of tribes, cities, etc.”)
4. Human Souls (ψυχαὶ ἄχρατοι—lit. “undefiled or immaculate person”)

However, far from this being the *only* division, Iamblichus delineates a myriad of interwoven subdivisions within these four hierarchies, displaying the Neoplatonic tendency to multiply the metaphysical layers with their analyses. The first class,

46 *Doxa* (δόξα) and *praxis* (πρᾶξις) refer to the binary components of “belief and practice” or “dogma and ritual,” that characterize religion.

47 “There are some, too, who say that soul is interfused throughout the universe: which is perhaps why Thales supposed all things to be full of gods,” (Aristotle, *De Anima*, trans R.D. Hicks, [New York: Cosimo Classics, 2008], 33).

48 John M. Dillon, Introduction to *Iamblichus: The Platonic Commentaries*, ed. and trans. John M. Dillon, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973), 49.

the Gods, are first divided into two classes, the *perkosmioi* or *enkosmioi* (περκόσμιοι, ἐγκόσμιοι—“cosmic”) Gods, which he refers to as being material and immaterial.⁴⁹ The “material Gods are those that contain matter within themselves and give it order, but the entirely immaterial Gods are removed from matter and transcend it.”⁵⁰ These two divine modalities of manifestation reflected Iamblichus’ doctrine of a distinction between *participated* and *unparticipated* aspects of an entity.⁵¹ To use part/whole terminology, the unparticipated face of an entity is that which is the whole in and of itself, without relation to the parts. The participated aspect is that which is the whole as constituted by its relations with the parts. An example of this principle in action might be an atom. As a monadic individual, the atom exists as an unparticipated unity. As a participated entity, it exists as a process of relations between several protons, neutrons and electrons. Furthermore, in typical Neoplatonic fashion, Iamblichus postulates a *third* level of Gods between the cosmic and hypercosmic. It was the Neoplatonic urge to mediate between extremes—the law of mean terms—that led Plotinus to develop the two additional hierarchical layers between the original two of Plato; Iamblichus carries this impetus further and thus achieves a system that is closer to a smooth transition between levels than was Plotinus’. This intermediary class of Gods were called *apolutoi* (ἀπολῦτοι—“liberated”), and consisted of those Gods which served a mediating function between the cosmic and hypercosmic deities.⁵²

Even application of the law of mean terms—which postulates that between any two terms there exists an intermediary term—along with the distinction between participated and unparticipated entities led Iamblichus to further sub-divide the daimōnic level into a triad that mirrors those of the Gods above: archangels (αρχάγγελος—“chief or principal angel”), angels (ἄγγελος—“messenger” or “one that announces”), and daimones.⁵³ This process was again replicated at the heroic layer leading to the following trinity: sublunary archons (ἡγεμονικοί ἄρκοντος—“authoritative or leading rulers”), hylic archons (ἔνυλοι ἄρκοντος—“material rulers”), and heroes.⁵⁴ As it was the final, consequent state of being, the physical layer of the hierarchy was *not* sub-divided in this manner. Thus, the resulting theological chain of emanation was stratified as such:

1. Demiurge
2. Hypercosmic Gods
3. Liberated Gods

49 Shaw, 135.

50 Iamblichus, *De Mysteriis*, trans. Gregory Shaw, in *Theurgy and the Soul*, 217: 4–8.

51 Remes, 70.

52 Shaw, 135.

53 Dillon, 51.

54 Ibid.

The Emergent Hierarchy

4. Cosmic Gods
5. Archangels
6. Angels
7. Daimones
8. Heroes
9. Sublunary Archons
10. Hylic Archons
11. Human Souls

The intermediary classes, the daimonic and heroic triads, “bind together in a continuous link from highest to lowest and make indivisible the community of the universe” that exists between the Gods and the Human Souls.⁵⁵ The daimones “serve the will of the gods, make manifest their hidden goodness, and give form to their superior formlessness.”⁵⁶ If a God is the *being* of whatever sphere of the cosmos is being considered, then the corresponding daimones would be the Forms and ideas that that being takes as it gathers shape in its emanative descent into the material world. Further down the chain are the *heroes*, beings who are “more akin to the gods, but still far inferior to them.”⁵⁷ The heroes are thus the *active* agents who directly interface between the æthereal realms above and the material spheres below. If we say that the daimonic entities “represent the lowest extension of the gods, one could say that the heroes represent the highest degree of the soul,” making the plenum⁵⁸ between the highest and lowest emanations a fluid continuum.⁵⁹ So, while the daimones serve a principally downward, emanative function, the heroes serve an upwardly directed *theurgic* place in the hierarchy, making their role less cosmological and more soteriological.

Theurgy

Up to this point, we have spoken only of the top-down cosmological vector of dependency that most strongly characterizes Neoplatonic metaphysics. There is, however, another vector that begins at the bottom and ascends through the plenary levels of the hierarchy. This act of rising formed the praxis which operated within the parameters laid down by the emanative schema. Theurgy (θεουργία —“divine rite”) was seen by Iamblichus as an activity wholly distinct from theo-

55 Ibid., 49.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 In this context, we may define a plenum as a completely filled space, the opposite of a vacuum.

59 M. Alan Kazlev, “Iamblichus’ Hierarchy of Spiritual Entities,” <http://www.kheper.net/topics/Neoplatonism/Iamblich-beings.htm> (accessed May 29, 2011).

logy. “For theology was merely *logos*,” a way of *speaking* about the Gods, “and however exalted, it remained a human activity, as did philosophy.”⁶⁰ Theurgy, however, was the veritable work of the Gods—work whose goal was to rectify the imperfections of man’s state in the final emanation by elevating the soul to the levels of the Gods themselves. Theurgical rites emerged from the innate orrectic impulse to rectify the imperfect state of multiplicity and to return to the henologically prime state of unity and perfection.⁶¹ The end result, the *magnum opus*, of the theurgic process was termed *henōsis* (ἑνωσις—“oneness” or “union”).⁶² *Henōsis* was thought of as the culmination of the climbing of the emanative ladder—the final state resulting from the reversal of the hypostatic transformation. The means by which this result was obtained was via the invocation of the various Gods who inhabited the realms above the physical emanation. The purported ability of the theurgist to call down the divine into the material sphere at first, however, appears pregnant with a problem: if the vector of dependence is unidirectional and strictly proceeds from the upper levels to the lower, how is it that beings in the lowest sphere could exert any influence over those in the higher layers? In Neoplatonic theology, the divine is clearly “not a self-evident part of human nature, but a thing over and above it.”⁶³

That being the case, how does the theurgist accomplish his task? Iamblichus was quick to resolve this problem. What he proposed was that rather than attempting to command or control the Gods, that theurgic praxes managed to shape the soul of the seeker so that the higher beings would deign to descend.⁶⁴ The difference, then, is that the Gods are invited into the receptacle that the theurgist—by the correct practice of meditation, prayers and rituals—has transformed himself into. The term Iamblichus uses for this preparation is *epitēdeiotēs* (ἐπιτηδειότης—“fitness, suitableness”), and refers to the aptitude of the theurgist to receive the God being invoked.⁶⁵ The process, then, is similar to the means by which one prepares an object to “better reflect a particular color of light; a golden object does not ‘compel’ yellow light to appear, but it allows the presence of the yellow in the white light to become manifest.”⁶⁶ So do the theurgic rites prepare the soul to

60 Shaw, 5.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid., 51.

63 Remes, 171.

64 Iamblichus, *On the Mysteries of the Egyptians*, in *Neoplatonic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*, eds. John Dillon and Lloyd P. Gerson, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2004), 229–230.

65 Shaw, 86.

66 Bruce MacLennan, “Evolution, Jung, and Theurgy: Their Role in Modern Neoplatonism,” <http://web.eecs.utk.edu/~mclennan/papers/EvolutionJungTheurgy-long.pdf> (accessed May 29, 2011), 19.

better receive the omnipresent Gods by reshaping himself into a proper vessel. He is like a lightning rod which, by virtue of his very constitution, naturally calls down the fire from the heavens. Through theurgy, man is able to bridge the gap between all the emanations, elevating his soul into the form of a hollow tube—a tube through which the divine influence is free to flow. This interfusion of the Gods of the upper emanations into the lower has, in its initial phases, the effect of raising the theurgist's soul to the level of the Gods: in other words, *theōsis* (θέωσις—"divinization" or "deification"). It is only with the completion of the theurgic process that the *theōsis* of the medial levels reaches the final state of *henōsis*: perfect union with God.

This final point, about *theōsis* being a necessary bridge between material existence and *henōsis*, is particularly important as it marks yet another advance that Iamblichus made away from Plotinus. "Unlike the system of Plotinus, where the soul could transcend its hypostasis and attain union with the One, Iamblichus fixed the soul in its ontological rank."⁶⁷ The beginning and end states in each system are nearly identical, but Iamblichus' belief that the emanations could only be transcended one at a time was a far cry from Plotinus' position—which echoes Plato's—under which the soul could rise from the Physical to the One in a single bound. Indeed, due to each emanation's being ontologically dependent upon the one *directly* preceding it, Iamblichus reasoned that the soul's ascent *must* follow a path that mirrored the descent. In theological terms, "the soul could not rise to the paternal Demiurge alone."⁶⁸ To climb to the top of the hierarchical ladder, "the soul had to be assimilated to the Whole, and this was accomplished only by honoring 'all the gods.'"⁶⁹ Although there was certainly no disagreement between Plotinus and Iamblichus on the fact that theurgy invariably led to the One, the latter reasoned that the gradation of the emanative process necessitated a similarly graded mode of ascent, in which the theurgist worked his way ever upwards—beginning with the heroic triad, passing on to the daimonic, then through the Gods, culminating with the *henōsis* with *the* God: the Demiurge.

The means by which this unification with the higher powers was achieved was manifold, but three principal methodological groupings can be identified. Key among all is the idea of the *sunthēmata* (σύνθηματα—"signatures," "symbols," or "signs"). The theory behind this term is that since the Gods occupy a high position in the ontological hierarchy and are relatively few in number, there are necessarily a number of different types of material objects which participate in the Gods. In the course of theurgic rituals, "such objects served as receptacles of the

67 Shaw, 79.

68 Ibid., 156.

69 Ibid.

gods because they preserved an intimate relation with them and bore their ‘signatures’...in the manifest world. As such they were pure specimens of the divine presence in matter.”⁷⁰ Just as the daimones are hypostases of the Gods, and heroes are hypostases of the daimones, so are the material fingerprints of the Holy emanations from above. In that way the physical symbols that have been historically associated with the various Gods of pagan pantheons were thought to be directly in lineal contact with the Gods they are proper to. Thus, by means of these *sunthēmata* did Iamblichus postulate that the theurgist could “procure...an indivisible communion with the Gods,” to awaken within himself the latent participatory modality proper to that deity.⁷¹ Examples of these symbols are nearly innumerable and everything from Óðinn’s association with ravens, to Zeus’ connection with the oak tree were explained via the *sunthēmata* concept.

Since the theurgist’s work began in the physical emanation, the principal theurgic rites are largely material in nature—dealing with the *sunthēmata* occupying the final level. Most common among these was the practice known as *telestikē* (τελεστική—“consecration”), in which divine images (e.g. statues, paintings, etc.) were specially prepared to function as receptacles for the Gods they represented by the offering by the priests of *sunthēmata* proper to the God.⁷² “Thus the image may function as a focus for contact with the god, allowing the theurgist to make inquiries, petitions, vows, pacts, etc.”⁷³ This was, again, much less of an act of “calling down” the Gods and much more of tuning the material object into the correct wavelength to pick up the divine signal that was already being broadcast. As such, once the deity deigned to possess the object, it became “a mean that functioned both as a projection of the soul’s powers and as an image of the powers of the god revealed in a single coherent form.”⁷⁴ The idol became, for a time, the living material *body* of the God being invoked.

A second extremely common theurgic practice was known as *katochē* (κατοχή—“a holding fast,” “detention” or “possession by a spirit”), in which the vessel prepared for the God’s descent is not an inanimate object, but a person.⁷⁵ While this operation could be performed by one person alone, it was typically done in a pair, with one person functioning as the recipient and the other as the operator. It

⁷⁰ Ibid., 48.

⁷¹ Iamblichus, *De Mysteriis*, 235: 5–9.

⁷² Algis Uždavinys, “Metaphysical Symbols and Their Function in Theurgy,” *Eye of the Heart: A Journal of Traditional Wisdom*, vol. 2, (2008): 50.

⁷³ Bruce MacLennan, “Individual Soul and World Soul: The Process of Individuation in Neoplatonism and Jung,” <http://web.eecs.utk.edu/~mclennan/papers/ISWS-TR.pdf> (accessed May 31, 2011), 15.

⁷⁴ Shaw, 167.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 87.

was common for the recipient to be a child, as it was believed that “prepubescent children are less likely to be possessed of sexual complexes and personal daemones, and therefore less likely to color the divinity’s voice with their own unconscious or subconscious content.”⁷⁶ The success of an attempt at *katochē* was dependent on two factors: the suitability of the receiver, and the hieratic power of the operator.⁷⁷ While it was certainly possible for one theurgist to be skilled enough in *both* arts to affect a true possession (as was the case with many of the oracles), it was apparently a much more widespread practice for the experienced theurgist to specialize in the latter skill. In fact, this was such a widespread practice that it continued through the Medieval theurgical texts into modern times. One of the best documented examples of this practice comes from the journals of John Dee (1527–1608) and Edward Kelley (1555–1597), who conducted a decade long series of skrying sessions with entities who identified themselves as Enochian Angels.⁷⁸ During these operations, Dee performed the active role of performing the hieratic invocations, while Kelley performed the passive role of receiver.

Now, the above two procedures could both be characterized as *lower* theurgy, for the *sunthēmata* involved are invariably material, and function from the position of the lowest hypostasis. There existed, however, a *higher* theurgy as well that functioned on a completely noetic level and was bereft of material tools.⁷⁹ The principal method by which this type of theurgy was carried out was by means of the *augoeides ochēma* (ἀυγοειδὲς—“starry, luminous” ὄχημα—“vessel,” “anything that bears or supports,” or “chariot”)—the body of light. Also known as the *augoeides sōma* (σῶμα—“the body of a man”), the body of light seen by Iamblichus as the means by which the theurgist ascended beyond the material world, into the realms of the heroes, daemones and Gods. It was conceived of as a “spherical body gained in theurgic rituals...[and] the perfection of this aetheric and luminous body effected the soul’s immortalization.”⁸⁰ Through elevating his soul within this spherical vessel of starry light, the theurgist was able to become Godlike, and transcend from his position of particularity into the Gods’ realm of universality. By these means, he would rise, penetrating each layer of the hierarchy, until the eventual attainment of *henōsis* was achieved.

Christian Neoplatonism

76 MacLennan, “Individual Soul and World Soul,” 15.

77 Ibid., 16.

78 *John Dee’s Five Books of Mystery*, ed. Joseph H. Peterson, (York Beach, ME: Red Wheel/Weiser LLC, 2003), 19–21.

79 Shaw, 190.

80 Shaw, 52.

After the end of the Classical period and the passing of the philosophical torch to the thinkers of Western Europe, Neoplatonism re-emerged from its Pagan origins in two forms. First among these is the phenomenon of Christian Neoplatonism. In the intervening years between the peak of the activity of Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, etc. and the thoroughly Catholic theologies of Augustine of Hippo (354–430) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), there were a handful of transitional thinkers who were responsible for Christianizing Neoplatonic philosophy and theology. Foremost among these was a man now known as the Pseudo-Dionysius, a late 5th century theologian and philosopher about whose personal life extremely little is known.⁸¹ Within the confines of our current discussion on divine hierarchies, his most important work was the tract *De Coelesti Hierarchia*, a highly influential work which adapted the Neoplatonic emanative schema to Christianity. It was through this work of the Pseudo-Dionysius that the Gods, daimones, heroes and pure souls of Iamblichus and Proclus were translated into the Christian experience—turning the Neoplatonic entities into varying types of Angels.⁸² What he presents us with is a nine-fold order—three classes, each with three sub-classes—that emanates forth from God:

1. The Godhead
2. The First Triad⁸³
 1. Seraphim (שרפים—“burning ones”)⁸⁴
 2. Cherubim (כרובים—“winged angel”)
 3. Thrones (θρόνος—“seat” or “throne”)
3. The Second Triad⁸⁵
 1. Lordships (*dominatio*—“dominions”)
 2. Virtues (δύναμις—“power,” “force” or “virtue”)
 3. Authorities (*potestas*—“powers”)
4. The Third Triad⁸⁶
 1. Principalities (*principatūs*—“rulers”)
 2. Archangels
 3. Angels

81 As an aside, he is called the *Pseudo*-Dionysius because during the following centuries he was confused with the authentic Dionysius the Areopagite, an Athenian convert of St. Paul (Frederick Copleston, *Medieval Philosophy: From Augustine to Duns Scotus*, vol. 2 of *A History of Philosophy*, [New York: Image Books, 1993], 91).

82 Pseudo-Dionysius, *On the Heavenly Hierarchy*, in *Dionysius the Aeropagite, Works* (1897), trans. John Parker, (London: James Parker and Co., 1987), 110.

83 Ibid., 121.

84 Latin and Hebrew etymologies were gleaned from the *Online Etymological Dictionary*: <http://www.etymonline.com>

85 Ibid., 124.

86 Ibid., 126.

This proved to be such an influential schema that it was adopted by Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa Theologica*, thus becoming canon.⁸⁷ While the specific contents of the hierarchical configuration varies from thinker to thinker, the same four-tiered pattern was replicated well into the late Medieval and early Renaissance grimoires such as the *Lemegeton*, which provided the theurgist with exhaustive lists of individual angels within these hierarchies and detailed rites to attract their influence and cajole them into descending to the material plane.⁸⁸

Furthermore, outside of the importation of Angelic hierarchies, Neoplatonism had a tremendous impact on the development of Christian panentheism during the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Johannes “Meister” Eckhart (1260–1327) was chief among the proponents of Plotinus, putting forth numerous sermons in which he delineated that God, as the One, extended into pure transcendence and was “something that must necessarily be above being.”⁸⁹ This position elevates the One, which Eckhart termed Godhead, above the God of the trinity: “God and Godhead are as different as heaven and earth.”⁹⁰ Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) was another thinker who, by the route of Eckhart, was a fervent proponent of Neoplatonic theology, and worked towards the formulation of a theology rooted in the conception of God as not being *beyond* being, but as the “One Absolute Maximal Being.”⁹¹ He, following Duns Scotus (1265–1308), “then conjoins Being and Infinity,” which results in a deity which “must include all beings and differences,” being at once immanent *and* transcendent.⁹² It was not, however, until the Italian Renaissance that the Neoplatonic texts which had been lost during the Dark Ages were rediscovered and translated into Latin by Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499).⁹³ It was Ficino’s work that reopened the doors into the Classical world which gave rise to the varied systems of belief that we now group under the heading of Western Esotericism. Contemporary Christian panentheism owes a

87 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Volume 1, Part 1, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2007), 533.

88 The second part of the book, “The Art Theurgia Goetia,” begins with an exposition of the hierarchical structure (Joseph H. Peterson, Introduction to *The Lesser Key of Solomon: Lemegeton Clavicula Salomonis*, [York Beach, ME: Weiser Books, 2001], 57–58).

89 Eckhart, *Sermon 17*, in *Meister Eckhart: An Introduction to the Study of His Work with an Anthology of His Sermons*, ed. and trans. James Clark (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957), 205.

90 Eckhart, *Sermon 12*, in Clark, 183.

91 Cooper, 53.

92 Ibid.

93 Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, *The Western Esoteric Traditions: A Historical Introduction*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 36.

tremendous intellectual debt to Plotinus, as the genealogy of this concept certainly demonstrates. It is not, however, with Christian Neoplatonism that this paper's thesis is concerned. Rather it is to the contemporary revival of *Pagan* Neoplatonism that we must turn our gaze.

Archetypal Psychology

Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961) was a Swiss psychoanalyst who founded the discipline of analytical psychology and was responsible for the introduction of concepts such as the collective unconscious, archetype, and complex to the contemporary psychological vocabulary. A colleague of Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), Jung adapted two of Freud's most revolutionary ideas and transformed them into the contemporary system of Neoplatonic psychology that is now associated with Jung and his students. The first of these notions was that the *psuchē* is *not* a monadic unity, but is rather a *plenum* of several distinct minds—or, alternatively, *layers* of mind. Freud developed a tripartite structure to describe mentality, consisting of the id, ego and superego. The id was seen as the mind that consisted of primordial instincts and drives; it was the animal mind that was largely inaccessible to every-day consciousness. It was within the id that Freud believed all of the chaotic, disordered and instinctual thoughts and desires arose.⁹⁴ The ego was viewed as the center of one's sense of self. It was the mind from which rational judgments and behaviors emanated, and functioned as a mediating agent between the animalistic id and the outside world.⁹⁵ Lastly, the superego was treated as the mind's *conscience*, and was constantly attempting to sway the ego away from the id's influence into more socially conventional modes of behavior—for, the superego was, more so than any of the three, intimately conditioned by the ego's social relationships.⁹⁶ Just as the id is the brute *description* of what the self instinctively begins as, so is the superego the *normative* complex that attempts to mold the instincts into something more suitable for the society within which the superego developed. And, it is in the midst of this psychic tug of war that the ego finds itself refereeing. The second idea that Jung borrowed from Freud was that of the unconscious mind. In the 19th century, theories of unconscious mental dimensions *were* already somewhat commonplace when Freud published his seminal *The Interpretation of Dreams* in 1899. However, despite Freud's initial dabbling in the idea of a two-fold division between the conscious and unconscious mind, his work in this area laid the groundwork for his eventual development of the id,

94 Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, standard ed., ed. James Strachey, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), 91.

95 Freud, "The Ego and the Id," *The Essentials of Psycho-Analysis*, ed. James Strachey, (London: Vintage, 2005), 450.

96 Peter D. Kramer, *Freud: Inventor of the Modern Mind*, (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 172.

ego and superego triad—of which the first and last members represent mental functions of which the conscious ego is largely unaware, making them *de facto* unconscious minds.⁹⁷

It was from this background both in Freudian theory and the hands on heterophenomenological research into his patients' minds—and autophenomenological research into his *own*—that Jung came to develop his theories. Like Freud before him, Jung treated the *psuchē* in plenary rather than monistic terms, and like Freud as well, he acknowledged that the conscious mind is but one island amidst a sea of unconscious minds. However, it is with this concept of the unconscious that Jung makes a decisive break with Freud, for in Jung's system there are two divisions of unconscious minds: the individual unconscious and the collective unconscious. In his own words, Jung differentiates the two as such: "The collective unconscious is a part of the *psuchē* which can be negatively distinguished from a personal unconscious by the fact that it does not, like the latter, owe its existence to personal experience and consequently is not a personal acquisition."⁹⁸ So, whereas the contents of the individual unconscious consist of things of which we have at one time been conscious, "the contents of the collective unconscious have never been in consciousness, and therefore have never been individually acquired, but owe their existence exclusively to heredity."⁹⁹

This is to say that our individual, personal unconscious is largely composed of memories and complexes that are unique to each person. There may be similarities between John Jones' and Mary Smith's personal unconscious minds based on similarities of biology, environment, culture, etc.—yet they would in no wise be *identical*. Each individual's life, the life that shapes the personal unconscious, is a necklace strung from pearls of events that can never be wholly replicated in the life of another. The *collective* unconsciousness on the other hand, is pre-existent and is of an "impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals."¹⁰⁰ Jung treated the collective unconscious as a universal layer of the *psuchē* which was common to all mankind and was a source of inborn mental attributes. The collective unconscious can be said to be a collection of "modes of behavior that are more or less the same everywhere and in all individuals."¹⁰¹ It is for this reason

97 Henk de Berg, *Freud's Theory and Its Use in Literary and Cultural Studies: An Introduction*, (New York: Camden House, 2004), 49.

98 C.G. Jung, "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious," in *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, The Collected Works of C.G. Jung, vol. 9, part 1, trans. R.F.C. Hull, eds. Read, Fordham, Adler and McGuire, (New York: Princeton University Press, 1959), 42.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid., 43.

101 Jung, "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious," in *The Archetypes and the Col-*

that we may say while the individual unconscious is the property of *a* man, the collective unconscious is the property of *all* men; it is as integral and universal a part of humanity as is our four limbedness, our configuration of organs, or our division into two genders. Just as these physical characteristics are—excepting deviations caused by accidents of environment and circumstance—patterned after a seemingly *ideal* human Form, so did Jung’s research indicate that the same mental analogs were similarly derived. Indeed, it was Jung’s position that the archetypes of the collective unconscious were the factors which were primary and *gave rise* to the secondary conscious psychic contents.¹⁰² To use the philosophical vocabulary, we would say that the individual unconscious is *ontologically dependent* upon the collective unconscious, just as the conscious mind depends upon the unconscious.

The governing forces of which the collective unconscious is composed were called *archetypes* by Jung. It is important to note a distinction at this point. Both the individual *and* collective unconscious ought not be thought of as mental analogs of some kind of spatial dimension within which archetypes and complexes exist. Rather, it is more in line with Jung’s thought that the totality of the unconscious minds consisted of these constitutive entities. In other words, each may be thought of as a true plenum, in which there is no “space” which is not occupied by a body—bodies which are in this case the archetypes or complexes. In this way, rather than thinking of the archetypes as extended *in* the collective unconscious, we can view the collective unconscious itself *as the extension* of the archetypes. But, what *are* the archetypes? Identifying them with the various Gods and Goddesses of the world’s mythologies, Jung wrote:

They form a species of singular beings whom one would like to endow with ego-consciousness; indeed they almost seem capable of it. And yet this idea is not borne out by the facts. There is nothing in their behavior to suggest they have an ego-consciousness as we know it. They show, on the contrary, all the marks of fragmentary personalities. They are mask-like, wraithlike, without problems, lacking self-reflection, with no conflicts, no doubts, no sufferings; like gods, perhaps, who have no philosophy...Unlike other contents, they always remain strangers in the world of consciousness, unwelcome intruders saturating the atmosphere with uncanny forebodings or even with the fear of madness.¹⁰³

lective Unconscious, 4.

102 Jung, “The Concept of the Collective Unconscious,” 43.

103 Jung, “Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation,” in *The Archetypes of the Col-*

The archetypes are the *sources* of our individual instincts—the shadowy hegemony from which the particularities of our mental complexes emanate. For all of the universal modes of instinctive human behavior, there is an archetype that sits above the conscious layer of actualization as a causative agent in the murky realm of unconscious potentiality. As Jung sees it, not only are our particular mental instincts *dependent* upon the archetypes, they are also *governed* by them—which is to say that in addition to the archetypes being the *genetic* causes of our individual unconscious contents, they also function as downwardly determinative influences upon the developmental patterns of behavior manifested by the particulars which emanate from them. It is from these psychic universals that the unconscious complexes which are particular to each individual emanate.¹⁰⁴ They are the manifestations of the archetypes as they descend from universality into the particularity of the individual. It should also be mentioned that “it is a mistake to think the archetypes are ‘merely psychological,’ with the implication that they are in some way imaginary and subjective. Rather, they are objectively real in that they are *empirical, stable, and public*.”¹⁰⁵ Their empirical nature can be seen from the fact that their “existence and character can be inferred from their effects in experience;” in other words, by observing innate behaviors among humans, we can induce that there exists a set of common, archetypal, behavior patterns which govern the manifestations of these particular expressions.¹⁰⁶ Their stability can be seen in the relative impermeability of human instinct. And their public nature stems from the fact that they are shared in common by all—making them accessible to each member of the species, not a select few.

If the reader finds himself thinking that this schemata is all too familiar, there is no need to worry—it *is*. The psychic structures described by Jung, as uncovered from his psychoanalytic research, correspond almost exactly to the hierarchies and emanative vectors of ontological dependence and downward causation of the Neoplatonists. This can be explained in two ways. Firstly, those who advocate the truth of the metaphysical models described by both would likely say that Jung’s *discovery* of the structures of the unconscious and its strong resemblance to that of Neoplatonism was an inevitability, as anyone engaging in psychonautic phenomenology is *bound* to uncover the same truths—just as any astronomer is bound to discover the same stars and constellations as any other who utilizes the same methodology. It is for this reason that Jungians often refer to the collective unconscious as “the objective psyche.”¹⁰⁷ Secondly, the strong similarities can

lective Unconscious, 287.

104 Jung, “The Concept of the Collective Unconscious,” 42.

105 MacLennan, “Evolution, Jung, and Theurgy,” 4.

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid.

also be understood as reflections of Jung’s having been *profoundly* influenced by Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy. Jung makes no secret of this, and in his preliminary definition of the archetype, he notes that the term itself “is an explanatory paraphrase of the Platonic εἶδος,” or Form.¹⁰⁸ Even the very word, archetype, “occurs as early as Philo Judaeus, with reference to the *Imago Dei* (God-image) in man,” then later “in the *Corpus Hermeticum*, God is called τὸ ἀρχέτυπον φῶς,” (to *archetypon phōs*—the archetypal light) and then in the writings of the Medieval Neoplatonist, Dionysius the Areopagite, “immaterial archetypes,” are referenced in regards to the celestial hierarchy.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, “although Jung cites Neoplatonists infrequently, he was inspired at an early stage of his career by the Neoplatonist scholar Friedrich Creuzer, who later edited the works of Plotinus, Proclus, and Olympiodorus.”¹¹⁰ All of this is in addition to the secondary influence to Neoplatonic ideas that Jung received from his exhaustive investigations into Gnosticism and Alchemy—both of which are heavily indebted to Neoplatonism. By means of comparison, the relationships between the terminologies of the Neoplatonists and Jung can be represented as such:

Neoplatonic Emanations	Neoplatonic Entities	Jungian Emanations	Jungian Entities
The Intellect	Gods	Collective Unconscious	Archetypes
The Soul	Daimones	Individual Unconscious	Complexes
Physical	Human Souls	Consciousness	Ego

To be sure, this model necessitates a slight reconfiguration of Plotinus’ system to suit Jung’s model, yet the impact of the former upon the latter is undeniable. In each system, there is a series of descending hypostases that proceed from universality to particularity in a gradated fashion. Furthermore, each of these emanative layers, in both systems, are composed of plena of entities which are beyond the reach of normal consciousness. We might further chart out a list of metaphysical commonalities shared by the two systems. Each model shares in common the ideas that:

1. The *psuchē* is both plenary in nature, and that this plenum is hierarchically organized in a vertical manner.
2. The layers of the hierarchy are populated by entities who, the further one

108 Jung, “Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious,” 4.

109 Ibid.

110 MacLennan, “Evolution, Jung, and Theurgy,” 3.

- proceeds from the egoic point, increase exponentially in the degree of their abstraction from the mode of consciousness/materiality.
3. Both the vectors of ontological dependence and causation/governance proceed downward, in a strictly unidirectional fashion.
 4. Knowledge of the archetypes is not gained empirically, but is in-born—transforming encounters with archetypal forces not as discoveries, but as remembrances of what has been forgotten in the *psuchē*'s descent from universality into particularity.

These parallels do not end as the descriptive level of Jung's psychological models, but continue with his soteriological methodology: the process of individuation. The term individuation is defined by Jung as "the process by which a person becomes a psychological 'in-dividual,' that is, a separate, indivisible unity or 'whole.'"¹¹¹ This procedure, which is essentially soteriological, begins from the natural position within which we find ourselves: that of misinterpreting the conscious ego as, not only the center, but the *totality* of the self. Indeed, the ego is, in Jung's model, both dependent on and governed by the archetypes—"the unconscious is the mother of consciousness."¹¹² As Jung wrote:

Just as consciousness arises from the unconscious, the ego-centre, too, crystallizes out of a dark depth in which it was somehow contained *in potentia*. Just as a human mother can only produce a human child, whose deepest nature lay hidden during its potential existence, so we are practically compelled to believe that the unconscious cannot be an entirely chaotic accumulation of instincts and images. There must be something to hold it together and give expression to the whole. Its centre cannot possibly be the ego, since the ego was born out of it into consciousness and turns back on the unconscious, seeking to shut it out as much as possible.¹¹³

Just as the theurgist finds himself to be a fragmentary façade of the One, so does the Jungian analyst find his ego to be but one body orbiting a mysterious center—a single member of a vast system. In each case, the aspirant finds himself humbled before the towering immensities that are the Gods.

The method by which the individuation process proceeds is two-fold, consisting of both *analytic* and *synthetic* functions. "First, it requires a person to break up

111 Jung, "Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation," 275.

112 Ibid., 281.

113 Ibid.

(i.e. analyze and make conscious) the prevailing state of unconscious identification with extraneous figures and psychic contents...Second, after a person has made some headway with analysis, individuation requires paying careful and continuous attention to the emergence of the Self. This is the synthetic aspect of individuation and requires heeding the spirit of the unconscious.”¹¹⁴ The analytic portion of the individuation process is largely concerned with breaking the illusion that the *persona* (the complex which the ego identifies with) is *the* Self and recognizing it as *a* self.¹¹⁵ This runs perfectly parallel to the Neoplatonic teachings on the *anatropē* (ἀνατροπή—“upside down”) nature of the soul, in which the theurgist was taught to recognize that the identification of his soul with his individual, material self was false—that the true soul was far greater and more inclusive than the anatomic self.¹¹⁶ It is vital, during this phase of the individuation process when the analysand disassociates the self from the persona, that he *not* replace that association with an archetype. “If a person succumbs to this temptation, the result is grandiose inflation (a “mania personality”). One becomes convinced that one is a prophet or a wise sage, a culture hero or demon lover, or another myth-sized figure, and an identity is forged from a psychological content that is archetypal.”¹¹⁷ Yet again, this runs parallel to the injunctions that the theurgical aspirant not succumb to the spiritualistic type of possession that the *goēs* (γόης—“sorcerer”) were known for. There is, in both systems of praxis, a distinction between the kind of unhealthy obsessive possession that takes over a person—where the possessing force can be said to *ride* them—and the previously described *katochē*, where the theurgist’s intent was to nourish “the intuitive mind and greatly [enlarge] the soul’s receptacles for the Gods.”¹¹⁸ In the former, the self is completely taken over by the possessing force, bringing the quest for individuation/*henōsis* to a halt. In the latter, the temporary and *intended* identification with not one, but *many* Gods is seen as a necessary component of the synthetic processes.

As the process of individuation depends on the synthesis of the conscious and unconscious dimensions of the *psuchē*, “individuality cannot manifest fully until the invisible, unconscious elements of the personality that lie outside the range of the ego complex are brought into the open.”¹¹⁹ In other words, once the analysand has realized that the persona and ego complexes are *not* the Self, he must then en-

114 Murray Stein, “Individuation: Inner Work,” *Journal of Jungian Theory and Practice* vol. 7, no. 2 (2005), http://www.junginstitute.org/pdf_files/JungV7N2p1-14.pdf (accessed June 5, 2011), 2.

115 Ibid., 4.

116 Shaw, 145.

117 Stein, 5.

118 Shaw, 87.

119 Stein, 10.

gage in the process of synthesizing *all* of the complexes and archetypes that comprise the individual and collective unconscious into a unified, harmonious whole. Just as this is the “higher” goal of Jungian synthesis, so was it the path towards *henōsis*. As the theurgist ascended upwards through the realms of the daimones and Gods, he had to gradually expand his soul to accommodate the synthetic sequence of *theōses* of “all the Gods” that led to the final goal of unity.¹²⁰ In neither case is the path upwards a straight shot to the end goal. The path is necessarily a slow process of assimilating and incorporating *all* of one’s various complexes and archetypes into a harmonious, systemically organized One. It is only when this is accomplished that “the whole individual emerges”¹²¹—that “unification with God”¹²² takes place.

From Emanation to Emergence

Throughout his writings, Jung tantalizingly hints at two different ways in which we can understand the archetypes. At times, he is forthright with his insistence that they are identical with Platonic forms,¹²³ yet at other times “he suggests that innumerable repetitions of typical forms of experience had resulted in the archetypes being somehow present in the structure of our brains.”¹²⁴ The problem between the mutual acceptance of *both* propositions at face value is that we now know that there is a fundamental distinction between the ways in which phylogenetic groups emerge from ontogenetic¹²⁵ individuals and the way in which Platonic particulars emanate from universals. What this realization has led to is for a new breed of Jungian analysts to rework certain “problem” areas of Jung’s psychological model to bring the system in line with the contemporary understandings of the emergence of human mentality gleaned from the disciplines of ethology¹²⁶ and evolutionary psychology. The resulting system—which is most clearly articulated in the contemporary works of Anthony Stevens and Bruce

120 Shaw, 156.

121 Stein, 12.

122 Remes, 171.

123 Jung, “Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious,” 4.

124 David Ray Griffin, “Archetypal Psychology and Process Theology: Complementary Postmodern Movements,” in *Archetypal Processes: Self and Divine in Whitehead, Jung, and Hillman*, ed. David Ray Griffin, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1989), 40.

125 Ontogeny is the individual development of an organism throughout the course of its life cycle. This is contrasted with phylogeny, which is the “evolutionary origin and development of a species,” (Anthony Stevens, *Archetype Revisited: An Updated Natural History of the Self*, [Toronto: Inner City Books, 2003], 355).

126 Ethology being the zoological sub-discipline specializing in the study of animal behavior in its proper environmental context.

MacLennan—is a neurotheological¹²⁷ approach to archetypal psychology that, by recasting the emanative vector of ontological dependence into one of *emergence*, arrives at a reformulation of polytheistic theology which not only concurs with the Neoplatonic/Jungian model of *what* hierarchical levels exist, but combines this with a Darwinian explanation of *how* these layers of reality are formed. This marks a radical shift from the Platonic conception of emanative essentialism to a more Aristotelian theory of emergence which, by resisting the pitfalls of orthogenesis,¹²⁸ is able to cast off the nascent supernaturalism of the former and enjoy the consistency of the naturalism that is the logical conclusion of the latter.

This being the case, what precisely does this shift from emanationism to emergentism entail, and for what reasons is it necessary? Emergentism's roots lie with Aristotle's solution to the problem of universals. Where Plato treated the particular as being ontologically dependent on the universal, Aristotle took the contrary position.¹²⁹ Rather, he invoked the primacy of *substance*—of the particular—over that of the Form. While disagreeing heartily with Plato's essentialism, he is also clear to sidestep the nihilistic dangers of nominalism,¹³⁰ which results in the position we now know as *Aristotelian realism*, where the existence of the Forms is ontologically dependent on the substances.¹³¹ In other words, for Aristotle, horseness as the essence of all horses cannot exist independently of *actual* horses. Its existence as a formal essence is wholly dependent upon its being actualized in particular individual horses. He believed that there was a “principle of growth” within organisms that was responsible for the qualities or form that would later emerge. Aristotle called this *entelechy* [ἐντελέχεια], the internal principle of growth and perfection that directed an organism to actualize the qualities that it contained in a merely potential state.”¹³² That is to say, for Aristotle, each individual contained a seed that was replete with the internalized Form of the or-

127 Neurotheology “is a unique field of study and investigation that seeks to understand the relationship specifically between the brain and theology, and more broadly between the mind and religion,” (Andrew B. Newberg, *Principles of Neurotheology*, [Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010], 1).

128 Orthogenesis is a teleologically oriented take on evolution which understands the evolutionary process as purposefully directed towards the actualization of a final goal. Notable proponents include Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man*, trans. Bernard Wall, [New York: Harper & Row, 1959], 108–109).

129 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* trans. W.D. Ross, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1038^b1–15.

130 Ibid., 1038^b25.

131 Ibid., 1038^b25–30.

132 Philip Clayton, “Conceptual Foundations of Emergence Theory,” in *The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis From Science to Religion*, eds. Philip Clayton and Paul Davies, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 5.

ganism, which pulled it towards the actualization of this potentiality—towards its perfection as an instance of the Form. This was *the* original impetus behind biological science, and for millennia after Aristotle, the idea that both ontogeny and phylogeny were teleologically oriented reigned supreme. As Aristotle’s metaphysics were heavily dependent on sequential causation, the Demiurge, who sat at the very *bottom* of the Aristotelian cosmos as the *first cause*, set in motion the *telos* (τέλος—“goal” or “purpose”) that governed all of creation. It was not until the triumph of Charles Darwin that teleologically driven theories of evolution were finally put to rest.

In the contemporary sense, then, what then do we mean by *emergence*? At their root, emergentist theories stand in contradistinction to the notion of *reduction*—the idea that all natural phenomena can be explained via a single set of descriptive laws. This is not to say that emergentism is somehow *anti-science*. Quite the opposite is true. It is, rather, an attempt to delimit the domains proper to each mode of explanation based on the level within the emergent hierarchy being dealt with. In other words, it stands opposed to the view that, given proper data, *all* phenomena could be reduced to the formulæ of physics. The emergentist sees complex systems which emerge from simpler constituent systems to be wholly differentiated from their antecedents and thus not reducible to them. For example, a natural philosopher in Isaac Newton’s day would likely have believed that, given sufficient data, the thought process of a person could be predicted with absolute certainty by the laws of physics. However, these

limitations to the programme of reductionism, understood as a philosophical position about science, do not affect everyday scientific practice. To do science still means to try to explain phenomena in terms of their constituent parts and underlying laws. Thus, endorsing an emergentist philosophy of science is in most cases consistent with business as usual in much of science.¹³³

In terms of a formal definition of emergence, there are four features that constitute the emergence process:

1. Ontological Monism
2. Property Emergence
3. Irreducibility
4. Downward Causation¹³⁴

¹³³ Ibid., 1

¹³⁴ Ibid., 2.

Ontological monism is a theory of substance which proposes that “all of reality is in essence either a single entity of a single kind of entity.”¹³⁵ Monism stands apart from dualism, which is the position that there are *two* primary substances, and pluralism, the notion that there are *many* substances which are mutually differentiated. Dualism has its roots in Plato’s essentialism, but found its full flowering in the Enlightenment with René Descartes’ (1265–1308) famous dichotomy between the *res cogitans* (mentality) and *res extensia* (materiality).¹³⁶ Pluralism originated with the Pre-Socratic Atomists, Democritus (470–360 BC) and Leucippus (5th century BC), but is generally absent in contemporary philosophical discourse.¹³⁷ Monism, then, presents itself in three forms: materialism, idealism and neutral monism. Materialism (or physicalism) is the position that the sole substance of which all is composed is *material* in nature—that no matter how far we break things down, the very *bottom* of the metaphysical hierarchy is some form of matter.¹³⁸ Idealism, materialism’s twin, is the exact opposite, putting forth the thesis that *thought* is ontologically primary. Originating with Parmenides, idealism also became extraordinarily popular in the Enlightenment, branching off into the metaphysical idealism of Bishop Berkeley (1685–1793), the transcendental idealism of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), absolute idealism of Johann Fichte (1762–1814), and the personal idealism of John McTaggart (1866–1925).¹³⁹ While the process of emergence can be said to occur in any of the varieties of ontological monism, it is with the third variant, *neutral* monism, that this paper will demonstrate is most in keeping with MacLennan’s reformulation of Neoplatonism. Neutral monism is an intermediary position between physicalism and idealism, proposing that the fundamental “stuff” of reality is neither mind nor matter, but is some sort of psychophysical substance that is at once both and neither—that mentality and materiality are in some way flip sides of the same ontological coin.¹⁴⁰ The most developed contemporary form of neutral monism is the *panexperientialism* of Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) and the process philosophers who followed in his wake.

Monism is, regardless of the particular type, an essential feature of emergentist theories for the reason that emergentism seeks to explain those very differences that are taken as ontologically primary in nature by dualists and pluralists *as emergent processes*. In other words, where a Cartesian sees consciousness and matter as intrinsically separate, neither being the source of the other, the emer-

135 Skrbina, 8.

136 Ibid., 13.

137 Copleston, *Greece and Rome*, 72.

138 Daniel Stoljar, “Physicalism,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/> (accessed June 9, 2011).

139 Skrbina, 10–11.

140 Ibid., 11–12.

gentist sees conscious neural systems as emergent properties of layer upon layer of processes, each emerging from a bottom foundation of monism. Thus might the emergentist explain that consciousness is a process that emerges from neurobiological process, that neurobiological processes emerge from chemical processes, that chemical processes emerge from physical processes and that physical processes (if the thinker is a physicalist) are ontologically prime and are the *source* upon which all higher tiers are dependent. The same chain of deconstruction could be replicated for idealist and neutral monist theories as well, but the line of reasoning is the same. Emergence explains what *appear* to be fundamental differences by means of *property emergence* (the definition's second point). This can be explained further by the following. For any emergent property (*P*) of an object (*O*), there are four conditions which hold true:

1. That *P* supervenes¹⁴¹ on the properties of the parts of *O*;
2. That *P* is not a property of any of *O*'s parts;
3. That *P* is distinct from any of *O*'s structural properties'
4. That *P* exerts a downwardly directed determinative influence upon the behavioral patterns concerning *O*'s parts.¹⁴²

This above example demonstrates the third point of our definition of emergence, that the emergent property is irreducible to the system's components from which it emerges. It is this point of the definition which *necessitates* that one adopt the presupposition "that reality is divided into a number of distinct levels or orders," which is "in stark contrast to what we might call 'New Age holism,'" where the whole is treated more as a flat plane—what Willard Quine (1908–2000) called a desert landscape—than the branching, tree-like structure of an emergent hierarchy.¹⁴³ Thus, according to this point, not only are the metaphysical structures themselves not directly reducible to their constituents, but also are the forms of causality associated with these structures similarly non-reducible. Animal behavior proves to be *the* paramount example of this principle of non-reducibility. While the individual cells of which any creature is composed can be demonstrated to behave in a regular fashion by the laws of biology, the individual creature which emerges from this mass of cells cannot be described by means of the same rules. The behavior of a cat demonstrates a degree of complexity that can in no wise be directly reduced to the behaviors of its component parts. On their own, these parts behave in one way, but their assemblage into the organic

141 The term "supervene" is defined by Dictionary.com as "to take place or occur as something additional or extraneous (sometimes followed by on or upon)," meaning that a property which supervenes on a system emerges as something additional to that system—something which none of its internal processes carry as an attribute.

142 Clayton, 3.

143 Ibid.

feline form births a new degree of complexity whose behavioral patterns are shared by none of the members of the aggregate of which it is composed. Thus, “in complex systems, the outcome is more than the sum of the parts.”¹⁴⁴

The fourth and final point of our definition of emergence is that of *downward causation*. This is the idea of whole-part influence, where the whole that emerges is able to exert causative influence over the parts from which it is constituted.¹⁴⁵ In this way, an emergent system’s behavior is not only *not* determined by its parts, but the future life-courses of those very parts are governed in part by the emergent system, leading to a model of causation whose vector is *bidirectional*. This is in stark contrast to the unidirectional vector of ontological dependency that we found in Neoplatonism. Under the emergentist model, there is the bottom-up vector that describes the constitutive causes which lead to the *existence* of the emergent entity, and there are also top-down vectors of governance which describe the effects that the behaviors of the whole have upon its parts. The animal proves itself to be, yet again, a perfect example. As discussed previously the animal itself is dependent upon the cellular and organic parts from which it emerges, yet as a complex system above and beyond those parts, it has a degree of novelty of action not owned by its constituents that allows it to influence their behavior in ways that they are individually incapable of doing. The cells compose that which *is* the cat, but the cat *itself* decides where the whole will go and what it will do. The cells have no choice in these decisions made by the cat, for the whole, in this instance, exerts near complete governance over its parts.

Evolutionary Thought

Alongside emergence, the process of *evolution* is a key concept in this paper’s re-working of Neoplatonism. And, as with emergence, evolutionary thinking also begins with Aristotle. Apart from being one of the two most influential Western philosophers, Aristotle is commonly regarded as “the father of all science.”¹⁴⁶ The philosophical Aristotle was a pioneer in metaphysics, logic, ethics and aesthetics; and at the same time, the scientific Aristotle virtually created the disciplines of physics, biology and psychology. Indeed, his collected works contain more dedicated writing on zoology than they do on any one philosophical issue. While Aristotle did *not* develop any kind of formal theory of evolution, he did lay the groundwork for later thinkers to do so. Much of Aristotle’s zoological work

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 4.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Henry Plotkin, *Evolutionary Thought in Psychology: A Brief History*, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 13.

consisted of cataloging the ways in which animal species were different from one another and in theorizing ways in which these species groups were related to each other—coining the term *genus* to refer to related groupings of species.¹⁴⁷ This recognition of the facticity of the relatedness of the whole animal kingdom combined with his treatment of all extent causative processes ultimately leading back to a primary uncaused cause, the Demiurge, perfectly set the stage for the theory of evolution to be developed in full. If all current states of nature are dependent upon anterior causes, and all causes lead back to a single cause, then it follows that the chain of causation necessarily follows an upwardly branching pattern from which differentiation evolves from a singularity. While a similar line of reasoning leads from the Neoplatonic *Phusis* to the One, the difference here is that Aristotle's conception of the world's unfolding was rooted in emergentism rather than emanationism. This necessitates that the combined differentiation and relatedness among phyla are the result of a bottom-up chain of events in which the complexity of the material world is conceived of as being dependent on further *material* rather than *ideational* causes. In other words, that there exist a number of related species in the world is not owed to a downwardly directed causative vector leading from the Forms, but stems from the branching of one biological group into several.

While this notion of biological evolution was not *specifically* worked out in detail by Aristotle, it was upon his work that all subsequent inquiries into the field would be made. It would not, however, be until the early 19th century that evolutionary thought would once again be pursued. This revival came at the hands of Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck (1744–1829). It was with his 1809 publishing of *Philosophie Zoologique* that Lamarck put forth his theory of evolution. While revolutionary at the time, we now know that Lamarck's orthogenetically driven theories were largely incorrect. His initial assumptions “were that organisms are always wonderfully adapted to their environments, but also that environments constantly change in time. From these it followed that the organisms themselves must be able to change in time.”¹⁴⁸ Thus, under Lamarck's theory, *all* biological change is in *response* to environmental change imposing an evolutionary imperative upon the organism. In this way, he viewed *all* physical adaptations as having developed in direct response to environmental pressures, giving them a distinct *purpose*. So, while these evolutionary changes were passed on via the line of genealogical descent, no adaptive change came from within the organism itself; all was directed externally. Evolution was the organism's adaptations to its form done so with the express purpose of increasing survivability in a changing world.

147 Aristotle, “History of Animals,” trans. d'A.W. Thompson, in *The Complete Works*, 486^a15–20.

148 Plotkin, 22.

The point about *purpose*, what Aristotle called *telos*, is important. This is what designates Lamarckian evolution as a teleologically driven theory. “It is essentially a theory of *progress* by way of the interplay of specified processes of environmental change, organismic needs and activity giving rise to changes within organisms that are passed across generations.”¹⁴⁹ This emphasis on evolution as a process of *progress* continued well into the late 19th century and, due to Herbert Spencer’s (1820–1903) popularizations, became a dominant force in that period’s philosophy of science. Within this framework “species may be placed along a linear scale...from simple creatures to the more complex.”¹⁵⁰ This notion of the evolutionary vector being completely linear in nature led to the popular idea that the transitions from simple unicellular organisms, to vertebrates, on down to the more “elevated” animals such as man represented a purposeful progression that was directed towards the end of the emergence of intelligence. Taken to its logical extremes, this orthogenetic position was fully fleshed out in the mid-20th century by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955), who equated the evolutionary process with the emergence of consciousness,¹⁵¹ thus treating man as the tip of the arrow of the vector of evolutionary ascent.¹⁵² As the orthogeneticists saw things, if the *purpose* of evolution is to evolve organisms into increasingly complexified forms, and as the goal of this complexity is the rise of consciousness and intelligence, then mankind simply *must* be the current pinnacle of evolutionary progress.

This theory of externally directed progress was not, however, to triumph. The evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin (1809–1882) has since been demonstrated countless times over as the more truthful explanation of phylogenetic change. Just as Lamarckian evolution was “driven wholly by external forces of change, which mediated by the altered needs and activities of organisms, became *impressed* by these external changes upon the malleable substrate of the organism and then transmitted to offspring,” so did Darwin completely contrast this by proposing that differences and variations in the biotic kingdom were “caused by events internal to each organism and occur in advance of and unconnected with changes in the world.”¹⁵³ This view of the evolutionary process as driven by *selection* rather than impression was a complete deviation from Lamarck’s model of linear ascent. If change occurs, as Darwin theorized, due to natural selection then it follows that the only *telos* that could be said to be affecting the process would be particular to each organism.

149 Ibid., 23–24.

150 Ibid., 25.

151 Teilhard, 243.

152 Ibid., 224.

153 Plotkin, 34.

This shift from an externally directed purpose to one which is internally directed completely strips Darwinian theory of the top-down mechanism of the orthogeneticists and naturalizes the picture into one in which evolution is a thoroughly bottom-up process of emergence. In other words, under the orthogenetic model a *single* change in the outside environment impressed changes upon the organisms within it, the Darwinian theory transforms this into a process by which undirected “changes are incorporated into an integrated bodily structure and function better suited to survival and reproductive competence (fitness), and somehow transmitted to offspring.”¹⁵⁴ So, while the Lamarckian theory may speak of higher and lower species, the Darwinian model only speaks of difference and change. It is a theory of *process* rather than *progress*. Thus, the overall picture transforms from a pyramid, with man at the very top, to a tree, with innumerable branches reaching outward in all directions. Following Darwin’s revolution, our understanding of the mechanism by which organisms evolve was dramatically increased by Gregor Mendel’s (1822–1884) discovery of the genetic heritability of traits, and James Watson (b. 1928) and Francis Crick’s (1916–2004) understanding of the role of DNA in transmitting genetic information from one generation to the next. While an in depth discussion of the discoveries of these men would prove interesting, it would stray far from this paper’s thesis. It will suffice to say that the discovery and subsequent mapping of the human genome has proven to be of the utmost importance in understanding how Darwinian selection occurs.

In short, the current understanding of evolution involves four mechanisms. Natural selection, which was Darwin’s original conception of evolution’s “how,” deals primarily with the evolutionary fitness of an organism.¹⁵⁵ That is to say that the genetic contribution made by any organism to the following generation is dependent upon its ability to do two things: survive and reproduce. Therefore, those organisms which are more likely to do both of these are more likely to pass on their traits to future generations than are organisms which fail at either. The second mechanism is *genetic drift*, which is the tendency that alleles¹⁵⁶ have to

154 Ibid.

155 Nicholas H. Barton, et al., *Evolution*, (New York: Cold Springs Harbor Laboratory Press, 2007), 464.

156 The term allele is defined by *The American Heritage Science Dictionary* as, “Any of the possible forms in which a gene for a specific trait can occur. In almost all animal cells, two alleles for each gene are inherited, one from each parent. Paired alleles (one on each of two paired chromosomes) that are the same are called *homozygous*, and those that are different are called *heterozygous*. In heterozygous pairings, one allele is usually dominant, and the other recessive. Complex traits such as height and longevity are usually caused by the interactions of numerous pairs of alleles, while simple traits such as eye color may be caused by just one pair.”

change on their own, in the absence of external selective forces.¹⁵⁷ In other words, due to genetic drift, given identical environments, two separate groups of organisms which began with identical genomes would eventually drift apart into two distinct genotypes.¹⁵⁸ The third means by which evolutionary change occurs is gene flow. This is the kind of interchange of genetic information that occurs when previously separate groups intermingle.¹⁵⁹ For example, during the course of any tribal migration from one region to another, the tribe in question is often subsumed by, or itself subsumes, another tribe. The admixture of these two genotypes results in the emergence of a genotype which is distinct from each of the two by virtue of having received genetic material from both. The final evolutionary mechanism is mutation. Mutations are similar to the allele changes in genetic drift, but most often occurs in concert with natural selection.¹⁶⁰ Mutation would be the genetic way in which a species which originally evolved in a normal environment gradually tends to lose pigmentation and eye sight when transported to a lightless environment. A primary example of this would be the blind, pigmentless lobsters recently discovered deep within the hydrothermal vents on the floor of the Pacific.¹⁶¹

The Blank Slate

The discoveries of these methodological means by which evolutionary change occurs in population groups revolutionized Darwin's original findings, giving scientists insight into how microevolution on the genetic scale eventually translates into macroevolution on the scale of animals such as birds, reptiles and humans. However, although these breakthroughs were primarily interpreted in terms of physical adaptations, a cotemporal exploration of the evolution of *mind* was being undertaken by a handful of dedicated individuals. The development of evolutionary psychology was, initially, met with disapproval from the behavioral psychologists of the early 20th century. The reason for this was the primacy that a particular epistemological theory had gained over the centuries: that of the *tabula rasa*. Like so many ideas in contemporary philosophy, the *tabula rasa*, or "blank slate," is a concept which arose out of Aristotle's critiques of Platonic metaphysics. Intimately tied to the theory of the Forms, was Plato's doctrine of *anamnēsis* (ἀνάμνησις—"a calling to mind," or "recollection"). In the *Phaedo* dialogue,

157 Barton, 418.

158 The complete genetic makeup of an organism (its *genotype*) can be contrasted with its physical makeup (its *phenotype*).

159 Mark Ridley, *Evolution*, 3rd ed., (Malden, MA: Blackwell Science Ltd., 2004), 359.

160 Ibid., 172.

161 E. Macpherson, W. Jones and, M. Segonzac, "A new squat lobster family of Galatheoidea (Crustacea, Decapoda, Anomura) from the hydrothermal vents of the Pacific-Antarctic Ridge," in *Zoosystema* 27, no. 4 (2006), 709–710.

Plato explains “that what we call learning is recollection,”¹⁶² for while we certainly do acquire some sort of knowledge about particulars, that core of any given particular that truly reflects the universal from which it emanates is not learned of by empirical observation. The knowledge of it is *remembered*, for, since the kinds of rational truths that Plato believes can be innately known via remembrance are *formal* truths (e.g. the principle of two similar objects being the same *type* of object, mathematical truths, etc.) that cannot *not* exist, they have been present in the mind eternally. That they are largely forgotten is, Plato would say, a symptom of the soul’s descent from the world of the Forms into the material body. Thus, for Plato, all “learning” of that category of rational truths was never truly the learning of something new, but was always the clarifying of that which was obscured by the mists of the material hypostasis, making his approach to epistemology the precursor to modern Cartesian rationalism.

For Aristotle, however, the process by which the mind obtained knowledge of truths was rooted more fundamentally in empiricism than rationalism. The term *tabula rasa*, which literally means “uninscribed tablet,” is an epistemological orientation that Aristotle developed to suit his critiques of Platonic metaphysics. If Plato’s rationalism is the natural consequence of emanation metaphysics, so, Aristotle reasoned, must empiricism be the epistemological cognate to emergentism. In what is the first psychological text, *On the Soul*, he writes:

If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that. The thinking part must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object.¹⁶³

Later in the same chapter, he concludes this thought with:

What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-table on which as yet nothing actually stands written: this is exactly what happens with thought.¹⁶⁴

In other words, what Aristotle is saying is that the process of thought is wholly receptive in nature. The mind is, at birth, a completely blank slate upon which experiences write themselves. This transmission of external data to our internal memory bank is the foundation upon which all subsequent doctrines of empiri-

162 Plato, *Phaedo*, trans. G.M.A. Grube, in *Plato*, 73b.

163 Aristotle, *On the Soul*, trans. J.A. Smith, in *The Complete Works*, 429^a10–15.

164 Ibid., 429^b1–430^a1.

cism rest. It stands in direct contradistinction to the rationalist thesis that some—if not *all*—truths can be known in the absence of the mind experiencing something outside itself. Indeed, although empiricists may concur with rationalists that certain types of truths (e.g. mathematical, logical, etc.) *are* eternally so, yet they would disagree that these truths can be known without their being experienced in some fashion. For example, while a rationalist might argue that upon seeing two things which are equal in some respect, such as two sticks of equal length, we *recognize* the facticity of their equality by virtue of recalling the intrinsically known Form of “the Equal.”¹⁶⁵ Whereas, the empiricist would argue the counter position that such knowledge of Forms emerges from repeated exposure to instantiations.

While empiricism *currently* forms the bedrock of popular epistemology, after Aristotle’s passing it was forgotten for over a thousand years. In the Middle Ages, much of the disputes between Aristotle and Plato were reenacted in a Catholic setting by Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure (1221–1274) respectively. However, it was not until John Locke’s (1632–1704) restatement of the empirical thesis that the *tabula rasa* concept reemerged from the hoary antiquity of the Classical world to take its place as the epistemology of natural science. In his widely influential *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* he phrased his position as:

Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any *Ideas*; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, From *Experience*: In that, all our Knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives it self.¹⁶⁶

This notion that *all* knowledge is necessarily *a posteriori* became firmly entrenched in the philosophies of science which followed in Locke’s wake. And, although psychology as a proper discipline did not emerge until centuries later, by the time it *did*, it took the *tabula rasa* as a given. This was the epistemological foundation of *behaviorism*, one of the first major schools of psychological thought. Behaviorism was an early 20th century train of psychological thought which revolved around the premise that *all* behavior and thought in an individual

165 Plato, *Phaedo*, 74a–b.

166 John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 104.

was entirely owed to external conditioning stimuli.¹⁶⁷ This was the origin of the *nurture* side of the still raging “nature vs. nurture” debate regarding the human mind. Thus did the behaviorists adopt so extreme of an interpretation of Locke’s *tabula rasa* that the very notion of such things as human instincts was denied—favoring the position that all “instinctive” behaviors were the results of postnatal conditioning. One of the intellectual leaders of the behaviorist movement, James B. Watson (1878–1958) famously stated:

Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed and my own specified world to bring them up in and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select—doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors.¹⁶⁸

This insistence upon the primacy of nurture over nature formed the basis for “the passionate opposition to human ethology and sociobiology expressed by Marxists psychologists and sociologists who are mythologically committed to the belief that human nature is unstructured and that all human behaviors arise from conditioning by social agencies.”¹⁶⁹ If human thought and the consequent behavior which stems from that thought is literally a blank slate at birth that can be inscribed with *any* set of pseudo-instincts, then this fuels the fires of those authoritarians who would see whole population groups programmed to behave in a particular way. This triumph of behaviorism stood upon the corpse of the abysmal failure of theories of human instinct that were rooted in Lamarckian thought. Yet, with the inevitable seeping of Darwinian ideas into psychological circles a contemporary challenger to the *tabula rasa* soon arose.

The refutation of pure empiricism in psychological epistemology would not, this time, be found by returning to a strictly Platonic rationalism. Rather, the response came from the blending of ethology and psychology that resulted in the emergence of evolutionary psychology. Now, at the time of behaviorism’s reign, the idea that *non-human* animals’ behaviors were largely (if not wholly) determined by biological instincts was taken for granted. Darwin himself defined instinct as:

An action, which we ourselves require experience to enable us to perform, when performed by an animal, more especially by a

167 Plotkin, 58.

168 James B. Watson, *Behaviorism*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), 104.

169 Stevens, 259.

very young one, without experience, and when performed by many individuals in the same way, without their knowing for what purpose it is performed, is usually said to be instinctive.¹⁷⁰

This is to say that, for example, when turtles swim to the shore to lay their eggs, they are not doing this because they have observed and learned this behavior from external sources. Their drive to do so comes solely from within; it is an in-born behavioral pattern that is common to all members of the species. This type of instinctive behavior, in Darwin's conception, also avoids the Lamarckian problem of teleology. The turtles do not swim ashore because they have some sort of *a priori* knowledge of what a beach is or why it is beneficial to their genetic continuance to lay their eggs there, yet due to countless generations of "selection acting *a posteriori* upon variant egg-laying behaviors had resulted in a particular species-typical behavior as an adaption for laying eggs."¹⁷¹ Thus, what initially appears to be some kind of Platonic *a priori* knowledge is explained to be *a posteriori* selective criteria which have been, via heredity, transformed into something resembling an *a priori*. That is the nature of instincts and mechanism by which they operate and evolve.

Working off of this theory of instincts, that certain varieties of animal behavior related to survival are performed without conscious purpose, Konrad Lorenz (1903–1989) founded the discipline of ethology in the 1930s. As the study of animal behavior in a natural environmental context—as opposed to previous methodologies which primarily relied upon the investigation of either dead animals or of live organisms in a laboratory environment—the ethologists were quick to discover that there are direct linkages between elements of animal behavior and the environments within which the animal evolved; this relation was termed "the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness."¹⁷² However, within psychology and philosophies of mind, the Cartesian idea of human exceptionalism—which bifurcated the world into one group, humans who were free willed and capable of novel behaviors, and another, all others whose behavior was determined by physical, chemical and biological laws—reigned supreme. This position, called philosophical libertarianism, that we humans have absolute free will and are capable of responding in whatever way we choose to whatever situation presents itself to us, stems naturally from the ego's experience of itself as a conscious agent. The widespread pre-philosophical belief in the absolute truth of this position which underlies most people's conception on themselves proved to be a bul-

170 Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species*, 6th ed., (New York: Mentor Books, 1958), 228.

171 Plotkin, 35.

172 Plotkin, 93.

wark against the application of ethology to psychology, for fear that such a combination would inevitably lead to a form of genetic determinism in which *all* of our thoughts and behaviors were pre-programmed in our genes.¹⁷³ Fortunately, the picture, as uncovered by evolutionary psychologists, is not a completely “nature” answer to the “nurture” of the behaviorists.

Beginning with Lorenz’s key discovery about the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness, a new school of psychologists began analyzing human behavior through the lens of ethology. Although they did take into account the fact that humans, as do *all* animals, display a wide range of behaviors which *are* instinctive, they did not espouse a strong form of genetic determinism. Rather, they conceived of instincts as releasing mechanisms for *patterns* of behavior or experience, the activation of which was dependent upon certain environmental cues. This differentiates the instinct as an inherited mode of functioning rather than an inherited idea.¹⁷⁴ To explain this, a physical corollary may be helpful. Take breathing for example; it is an involuntary biological pattern of activity that all humans must breathe. This behavioral pattern is inherited and is a necessary function related to our respiratory and circulatory systems. However, *within* this inherited pattern of behavior, we have the ability to consciously shape certain aspects of this behavior’s manifestation. We can choose to breathe fast, slow, or to hold our breath. In times of duress, unconsciousness, etc. our instinctive mode takes over and breathing is automatically regulated to suit the present environmental cue (e.g. slow elongated during sleep, staccato during physical exertion, etc.). We do not *learn* to breathe; it is an instinct. Yet, we *can* learn how to control our breath, as any athlete or *yogī* will tell us. In this same way is our performance of more complex behaviors such as mating, parenting, etc. *guided* by instinctive patterns yet not wholly determined by them. In this way, we might think of instincts as like rivers. We can canoe down a river and, to a degree, control where amidst the waters we travel, yet we are at once constrained both by the spatial dimensions of the riverbed (the patterned mode of behavior) *and* the forward flowing course (the biological imperative to perform instinctive actions which relate to our survival). In this way, the epistemology of the evolutionary psychologists is neither Platonic nor Aristotelian, but is rather a synthesis of the two, incorporating both a phylogenetically determined set of behavioral matrices that are expressed ontogenetically as well as the ability for previously unknown information to be learned empirically and for novel behavior to be exhibited within pre-structured modes of expression.

MacLennan’s Synthesis

¹⁷³ Stevens, 9.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 18.

Within this overarching backdrop of emergentism, evolution and the nature/nurture problem, we may now begin to explore the system of thought which is this paper's central concern: Bruce MacLennan's synthesis of Classical Neoplatonism, Jungian psychology, and the theories of emergence and evolution into a single explanatory model. To begin, let us reexamine the relationship between Jungian archetypes and the instincts. Jung maintained that "the archetypes are the unconscious images of the instincts themselves, in other words, that they are patterns of instinctual behavior."¹⁷⁵ He identified the archetypal with the instinctual so strongly that we might go so far as to say that "the hypothesis of the collective unconscious is, therefore, no more daring than to assume there are instincts."¹⁷⁶ MacLennan takes this correlation of Jung's and expands its meaning to account for our new found understanding of the origin of instincts as described by evolutionary psychology. MacLennan examines Jung's distinction between the *internal* and *external* aspects of archetypes. The external manifestations are the instinctual behaviors that are observable, quantifiable, etc. The internal aspects are the archetypal images themselves.¹⁷⁷ So, if we take, for example, the Mother archetype, the external aspect would be that universal set of instinctive behaviors that mothers display towards their infant children. The internal manifestation of this would be the various mother deities of the world's religions. To the outside observer, the actualization of this dynamic pattern of instinctive behavior simply appears as normal actions appropriate to the situation, yet for the mother, "when an appropriate *releasing stimulus* activates the instinct, you may feel you are living a myth or that you are possessed by a spirit with its own agenda."¹⁷⁸ The releasing stimulus in this case would be the correlative instincts that the child is born with. Evolutionary psychology tells us that children are genetically endowed with the predispositions to appropriately interact with the world through the family structure, and that its earliest instincts are largely geared specifically towards activating the maternal archetype of its own mother.¹⁷⁹ Thus, in a situation like this, a newborn, whose mind is more unconscious than conscious, operates nearly entirely in the mode of the Child archetype, which in turn serves as the releasing stimulus to activate the Mother archetype. The two have a psychic relationship that is one of mythic symbiosis—their instinctive behavior reenacting the universal myths of the Great Mother and the Holy Son (e.g. Frigga and Baldr, Isis and Horus, Mary and Jesus, etc.).

175 Jung, "The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious," 44.

176 Ibid.

177 MacLennan, "Evolutionary Jungian Psychology,"

<http://web.eecs.utk.edu/~mclennan/papers/EJP.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2011), 2.

178 Ibid.

179 Stevens, 107.

Now, this conception of archetypal possession is none too different from Jung's, except in the fact that MacLennan (following Stevens' lead) specifically advocates the position that the archetypes are *evolved* portions of our minds—something Jung likely would not have *disagreed* with, but never personally espoused. It is this evolutionary origin of the archetypes that serves as the necessity for MacLennan's reversal of the vector of ontological dependency which leads to the constitution of the archetypes. He explains this via the connection between the genome and the unconscious. An individual's genome is the sum total of that person's genetic makeup, a sequence of millions upon millions of bits of genetic data all stored within the nucleus of each cell of one's body. Each person's genome is the *seed* of their archetypal world. This is, again, not strict genetic determinism, for even though an acorn can only grow into an oak tree, so is the individual tree's pattern of actualization affected by environmental conditions.¹⁸⁰ In the same way the *ontogenetic* seed that is an individual's genome necessarily develops within a *phylogenetically* determined pattern, yet within that pattern the unfolding is affected by the environment (both physical and interpersonal) within which this development occurs. This governance of the ontogenetic *psuchē* (the individual unconscious) by the phylogenetic *psuchē* (the collective unconscious) still lines up nicely with the Neoplatonic and Jungian theory of emanation. However, evolutionary understandings of the relationship between ontogeny and phylogeny render this thesis null in two ways.

First, the Neoplatonic conception of the Forms was that they were *eternal* and *unchanging*. An evolutionary understanding of instincts fundamentally precludes this as a possibility. To be sure, such things are *relatively* unchanging, yet change *does* occur on an evolutionary time table (on the order of a hundred or more generations). "Thus the archetypes are not innate *images*, as it is often supposed, but *dynamic forms* shaping perception and behavior."¹⁸¹ This is so because "the genome is not a fixed essence, but a time-varying form."¹⁸² This admission of dynamism does not change the fundamental *nature* of the archetypes. Under this view they are still empirical, stable and public. Yet, the notion of stability must now be seen as an extremely slow moving type of flux rather than Plato's ideal fixity. If change and adaption are constant factors in the evolution of a species, the instincts that form the unconscious backbone of that species' behavior must be in just as constant an evolutionary state of flux as are their phenotypical¹⁸³ attributes. When considering only the external behavioral aspects of the arche-

180 MacLennan, "Evolutionary Jungian Psychology," 5.

181 MacLennan, "Evolution, Jung, and Theurgy," 2.

182 Ibid., 15.

183 Where the genotype is the genetic profile of an organism, its phenotype is the outward manifestation of the active portions of this genetic code—in other words, one's physical characteristics.

types, this may seem, nowadays, like a given and no big deal. However, when the internal aspect is taken into account, such a reformulation has tremendous theological consequences. If the Gods are the *products* of evolutionary processes, then they are neither unchanging nor eternal. Their existence and forms are intrinsically linked to humanity's phylogenetic development. Far from being atemporal, they are *in process*—something which is quite far indeed from Plotinian and Iamblichean theology.

The first objection raises the second. The relationship between ontogeny and phylogeny—the evolution of individuals and of population groups—“must avoid *essentialism*, the notion that there is an ‘ideal kind’ for each species.”¹⁸⁴ Although the human genome is connected to the individual genome in a way that mirrors the Platonic relationship between the Form of the ideal man, *Anthrōpos* (Ἄνθρωπος—“*man* generally”), the vector of ontological dependence is not the same. MacLennan tells us that the phylogenetic Form of man is “an Aristotelian abstraction from particulars...rather than an eternal Platonic essence.”¹⁸⁵ In other words, the genome as a thing unto itself *emerges* from the individual genotypes of extant actual humans at any given time. The individuals do not *emanate* from the genomic universal; the converse is true. In this way we see that rather than men being dependent upon Man, Man is only capable of emerging from men and cannot, as an idea, exist without them. This shift from Platonic to Aristotelian vectors of dependence *does* keep in tact the basic “shape” of the Neoplatonic cosmos, but the way in which they are related to one another is drastically altered. In other words, MacLennan's recasting of Neoplatonism still admits a realism which manifests as a multi-tiered hierarchy of metaphysical layers. The change is in the bottom-up reversal of the ontological vector of dependence.

This, again, has staggering theological ramifications. As we remember, according to the Classical Neoplatonists, man, quite literally, came *from* the Gods. The downwardly directed emanative vector ensured a logical way of understanding this in a sense that at once incorporated the long held Pagan notions of this relationship consisting of:

1. Hereditary descent from the Gods.
2. The dependency of the material world upon the celestial.
3. The governance of mankind by the Gods.

Though it may seem that MacLennan's reversal necessarily negates all three of these propositions, it is really only the second that is fundamentally incompatible

184 Ibid.

185 Ibid.

with an Aristotelian recasting of the emanative vector into one of emergence. Let us begin with the third point. As mentioned in the paper's section on emergence, *downward causation*, is a hallmark feature of *all* emergent processes. Thus, we do know that phylogeny *does* govern ontogeny (e.g. individual humans, regardless of particularities, develop into *humans*), thus would the collective *psuchē* govern the behavioral unfolding of the individual *psuchē*. The internal cognate to this relationship is that we, as individuals, are governed—via the emergent process' downward causation—by the Gods. They are in positions of spiritual authority over us such that our behaviors, attitudes, emotions and thoughts are beholden not only to their subtle guidance (*viz.* the large scale governing of ontogeny by phylogeny), but also to their possession at critical times (*viz.* the activation of particular archetypes by corresponding release stimuli). The first point, the near universal Pagan belief that the Gods sit at the top of humanity's family tree, is upheld by this large-scale phylogenetic governance. Not only is an individual's personal ontogenetic development an acorn which has budded off of the phylogenetic tree of Man, such is true for mankind as a whole. In a very real way, MacLennan's recasting makes this hereditary connection to the Gods that much *closer*. In the past, it was only thought that such a link was made in the misty days of anthropogenesis. Yet, under MacLennan's view, the divine creation of man occurs with *each and every* ontogenesis. The anthropogenic myths in which Óðinn, Hœnir and Lóðurr bequeath life upon driftwood,¹⁸⁶ or Yahweh's breathing of life into dust¹⁸⁷ are not, under this restructuring of Neoplatonism, *historical* events that happened at some discrete point in the past. Rather, they are to be seen as processes which are continually occurring in the beginning of every ontogenetic process. The creation of man by the Gods is not something that *happened*; it is something that is *happening*.

In this way, not only does MacLennan's Neoplatonism *not* strip the Gods of their divinity by recasting them as ontologically dependent upon humanity, but, quite the opposite, it *increases* their dominion. Another point which MacLennan's theology resolves rather nicely is that of the goodness of the Gods. Following Plato, Plotinus identified the One the Form of the Good.¹⁸⁸ In this way, lesser hypostases, the Gods, were seen as rarified and differentiated manifestations of the Good. This, however presents a dramatic problem in that the Gods, as described in the myths of the world and as experienced autophenomenologically during the grips of instinctive possession not only often *do not* comport themselves in accord with Plato's idea of the Good, but also tend to be at odds with one another

186 *Völuspá* in *The Eddas: The Keys to the Mysteries of the North*, trans. James Allen Chisholm, <http://www.woodharrow.com/images/ChisholmEdda.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2011), 5.

187 Genesis 2:7.

188 Remes, 39.

(e.g. the wars between the Olympians and Titans, or the Æsir and the Jötnar). MacLennan's solution to this is to conceive of the Gods *not* as *absolutely* good, but as anthropocentrically good, in that "they have promoted the survival of our species."¹⁸⁹ In a way, they are "beyond good and evil," for such terms are culturally conditioned superego complexes; the archetypal Gods are not bound by cultural mores and "serve their own ends, which may not be ours, and their inclinations may not conform to contemporary standards of morality, or promote our individual interests."¹⁹⁰ As beings which comprise the *collective* mind of mankind, their interests must necessarily be concerned with the long term survivability of that collective. Sometimes this may overlap with that of the individual or a particular culture, but oftentimes it does not.

One point further brought up by MacLennan that somewhat clashes with the sensibilities of the Classical Neoplatonist is the notion that the Gods relate differently to different types of people. Under Plotinian and Iamblichean Neoplatonism *theōsis* was the reception of the divine by the properly prepared human soul. Under that model the Gods existed independently of humanity and would likely be experienced similarly by all people able to attain the same level of *theōsis*. However, evolutionary Jungian psychology tells us that there are significant differences in the human experiences of archetypes, and that this differentiation is most strongly typified in the male/female dichotomy.¹⁹¹ Jungians explain these differences by means of the Anima and Animus archetypes. All humans are divided, sexually, into two genetic groups: those bearing XX chromosomes (women) and XY chromosomes (men). This genotypical variation is the root of phenotypical dimorphism, the psychosomatic variations that differentiate men from women.¹⁹² However, "everybody carries qualities of the opposite sex, not only in the physical sense of contrasexual genes, hormones and anatomical vestiges, but also in the psychological realm of attitudes, feelings and ideas."¹⁹³ Jung discovered that the psychic manifestations of these were archetypal, with men carrying a feminine archetype called the *Anima* and women a masculine archetype known as the *Animus*. The presence of these contrasexual archetypes within each person was seen by Jung as the means by which potential mates were instinctively driven to comprehend the numinous *otherness* of the opposite sex. "Thus the whole nature of man presupposes woman, both physically and spiritually. His system is tuned to woman from the start," and *vice versa*.¹⁹⁴ The physical aspect is self explanatory, human biology necessarily presupposes two op-

189 MacLennan, "Evolution, Jung, and Theurgy," 16.

190 Ibid.

191 MacLennan, "Evolutionary Jungian Psychology," 6.

192 Ibid.

193 Stevens, 76.

194 Jung, *Man and His Symbols*, (London: Aldus Books, 1964), 50.

posite sexes in order for genetic continuation to occur. It is, for our purposes, the *internal* aspect that is far more interesting. Stevens tells us that the intense attraction that is felt by a man towards a woman occurs when she is seen to be the embodiment of his Anima. Because of this she may *seem* to him to be “more beautiful, more numinous than any other woman around—often to the stupification of his friends who completely fail to understand what he sees in her.”¹⁹⁵ This is one of the most commonly experienced instances of what Jung called *archetypal projection*, where one party (in this case, the man) is possessed by an archetype. That archetype, in turn, projects upon a person with whom the man is relating (in this case, the woman) the archetype that complements the one doing the possessing.¹⁹⁶ This process of projection is not *limited* to the Anima and Animus, but it is this projective mode that can be so utterly striking that we still refer to it in opaquely mythic terms as having been struck by Cupid’s arrow. This instinctive mode of behavior in which the whole of one’s being becomes entwined around the numinosity of another might be called the Eros archetype (after the Greek God of erotic love), but as this is a case in which archetypal variation between population groups is expressed, we cannot accurately speak of this kind of divine intervention as being caused by a *single* God, but by a *pair*—with each party being under the influence by one.

Delving further into this notion of differences in hierophanies¹⁹⁷ between individuals, we come to MacLennan’s treatment of the *daimones*. As mentioned previously, Jung equated *complexes* (the constituents of the individual unconscious) with Neoplatonic *daimones*. In MacLennan’s terms, the place held by the *daimones* as intermediaries between the Gods and men can be described via evolutionary mechanisms as “networks of associations...[that] are created by intense or repeated activation of the archetypes in the ontogenetic psyche,” making each archetype “a nucleus for complexes, which constellate around the *universal* archetypal core, but incorporate *individual* associations, formed according to the laws of similarity and contiguity.”¹⁹⁸ In this way, MacLennan applies the principle of emergence equally to complexes as well as archetypes. The only difference here is that the emergence of the two levels is not strictly upwards. The emergence of the complexes as formed from interactions between the individual and the archetypes seems to necessitate a prior emergence of the latter. So in this way we have a vector of ontological dependence which, between man and the Gods is directly upwards, but for the *daimones* leads both up from man and down

195 Stevens, 76.

196 Stevens, 180–181.

197 Hierophany, from the Greek *ἱερός* (*hieros*—“holy”) and *φανερός* (*phaneros*—“open to sight” or “visible”), meaning the experience or manifestation of the holy or holiness.

198 MacLennan, “Evolution, Jung, and Theurgy,” 10.

from the Gods, meeting in the middle. Yet, this dual sourced ontological dependency does not place them higher than *both* in the metaphysical hierarchy, but betwixt the two, since they are in a way similar to a quale¹⁹⁹ that emerges not from a collection of like organisms, but between the interaction of two different objects. So, in this way we can think of the archetypes as being biologically conditioned by the collective genetic structure of man, while the complexes are conditioned by the interplay between that universal structure and its individual constituents. This being the case, the daimones take on attributes from both sides of the spectrum, making them *individualized* entities which mediate between men and the Gods. And, like archetypes, complexes behave as if they were independent, autonomous beings, making the internal experience of them take on a *numinous* quality similar to that of an archetypal experience.²⁰⁰ And, like the Gods, they are more than capable of participating in the activities of both possession and projection.

MacLennan identifies several important complexes which bear mentioning in this evolutionary context. The first is the *ego complex*, the conscious mind. As noted before, this is just *one* complex among *many*. Certain evolutionary pressures have pushed it to the forefront of our recognition in the internal daimonic hierarchy, but “the ego is not in charge, nor should it be.”²⁰¹ The complex that both MacLennan and the Classical Neoplatonists believe *ought* to be treated as dominant is the higher self. “The Higher Self comprehends the totality of the archetypal field, and therefore it comprehends all the archetypes.”²⁰² The ego is no more to be confused with the higher self than a limb is to be confused with the totality of a person. The higher self is the *ontogenetic* complex that emerges from the plenary collections of complexes which constitute our individual unconscious. Just as the Neoplatonists conceived of a transcendental Demiurge sitting atop the pyramid shaped emanative hierarchy, so does the higher self sit at the top of our internal daimonic constellation. As before, however, the process by which this complex is formed is emergent, not emanative, so the vector of dependence still rises upwards from the various internal complexes to this arch-complex. As it encompasses both conscious and unconscious dimensions of the *psuchē*, the higher self is *superpersonal*. The persona is yet another complex (that with which the ego identifies most strongly), which is completely transcended by the emergence of the higher self through the individuation process. This higher self

199 Quale (pl. qualia) is a Latin term meaning “what sort.” A prime example of qualia in the everyday world would be the taste of a beverage. The metaphysical entity that is the taste itself resides neither in the tongue of the taster nor in the liquid of the beverage. It emerges as a third term as a consequence of their interaction.

200 MacLennan, 11.

201 Ibid., 12.

202 Ibid.

can, MacLennan argues, be further identified with the particular type of personal daimōn that was believed to embody a person's fate. This identification would include Socrates' daimōn,²⁰³ the *fylgja* of the Norse,²⁰⁴ the Holy Guardian Angel of the Medieval Christian theurgists²⁰⁵ and many other cultural representations throughout history.

Another daimōn of extreme importance within the ontogenetic *psuchē* is the *superego*, which “may be defined as the moral complex.”²⁰⁶ This is the complex which functions as the center of one's sense of morality, that little voice in our heads that we often identify as our *conscience*. “This inner parental figure and moral judge perpetually strives to censor and ‘jail’ any aspects of the Self which it has learned through experience may prove unacceptable to significant others and result in” consequences which are anathema to the organism's evolutionary fitness in the societal environment.²⁰⁷ Just as the archetypes influence our behavior as it relates to *biological* functions and processes, so do the complexes influence us within those aspects of the social sphere that are outside the realm of pure biology. Within the Neoplatonic context, this complex can be positively identified with the Neoplatonic *agathodaimōn* (ἀγαθοδαίμων—“good daimōn”) or the Roman *genius*, which was thought of as a kind of moral guide which served to facilitate the person's interaction with society.²⁰⁸ The obvious cognate to this, and other similarly structured complexes, are the legions of tutelary and guardian spirits that one finds at the lowest personal, levels of Pagan religious practices worldwide. These spirits are *not*, MacLennan explains, strictly limited to serving personal functions either. Indeed, superegoic complexes “may be shared by families and other groups, even entire cultures.”²⁰⁹ These complexes which are shared by different levels of population groups would serve as culturally conditioned mediating entities which comprise the gradated levels of the psychic hierarchy that exists between the personal and the universal. MacLennan treats *all* of these intermediary hypostases as being environmentally conditioned (e.g. by one's family, village, tribe, etc.), yet this is one of three points to follow where I question the complete descriptive accuracy of his model.

Two Layers of Archetypes

203 Plato, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, *Symposium*, in *Plato*, 202d–e.

204 Rudolf Simek, *Dictionary of Northern Mythology*, trans. Angela Hall, (Suffolk, England: D.S. Brewer, 2008), 129.

205 [Abraham of Worms], *The Book of the Sacred Magic of Abramelin the Mage*, trans. S.L. MacGregor Mathers, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1975), 49.

206 MacLennan, “Evolution, Jung, and Theurgy,” 12.

207 Stevens, 232.

208 MacLennan, “Evolution, Jung and Theurgy,” 12.

209 Ibid., 10.

This first point of departure between us comes from his treatment of the ontological reality of the specific Gods of various pantheons. In a polytheistic theological setting, there are generally two ways to treat this issue: hard and soft polytheism.²¹⁰ Soft polytheism is the position which stems from Classical Neoplatonism and has been recently espoused by Jung, Joseph Campbell (1904–1987)²¹¹ and others within this continuum of thought. Under this position, the particular Gods of culturally specific pantheons are seen as *faces* of universal Gods (e.g. Frigga, Isis, Mary, etc. are all hypostatic façades of the universal Great Mother Goddess). Hard polytheism, on the other hand, is exceedingly common among contemporary practitioners of reconstructed forms of Paganism (e.g. Heathenry, Hellenismos, Celtic Reconstructionism, etc.), and advocates the contrary position that the tribal Gods are both ontologically *unique* and non-dependent upon some collection of universal Godforms. This is compounded by the unique connection that ethnic exclusivist²¹² practitioners see between a pantheon and the population group of which they are the traditional Gods.²¹³ While a soft polytheist necessarily sees polytheistic religiosity as universal in nature, with *all* culturally specific Gods being pathways to the true, universal Gods, hard polytheists of the ethnic exclusivist persuasion treat the connection between a people and that people's Gods as one that is private—meaning that the nature of the connection between the two precludes a member of one tribe from engaging in a relationship with the Gods of another tribe by virtue of the special relationships that exist between the Gods and their peoples. MacLennan supports a variation on the soft polytheistic theology with his view that culturally particular Gods are ontologically subordinate to and dependent upon universal Godforms by treating them as group complexes which emerge from “similar patterns of association with an archetype” shared by the group as a whole.²¹⁴ In this way, the tribal Gods of the Greeks, Romans, Celts, Germanics, etc. are seen as a sub-category of daimones which are engendered by the repeated, culturally conditioned interplay between members of the group and the universal archetypes. While this argument is, in a way, quite

210 Timothy Alexander, “Types of Polytheism,” <http://hellenismos.us/b/2010/10/types-of-polytheism/> (accessed Jung 16, 2011).

211 Campbell's soft polytheistic theory of the monomyth is delineated in exquisite detail in his *The Hero With a Thousand Faces* (Novato, CA: New World Library, 2008).

212 It ought be noted that ethnicity is, in this usage, *not* synonymous with race, but rather encompasses the shared ancestral, cultural, linguistic and religious bonds that tie an organic group together.

213 This position of ethnic exclusivism, called *folkism* by Germanic Neopagans, is explored in a more or less even handed manner in the following publication: Kveldúlf Gundarsson, ed. *Our Troth*. vol. 2 (North Charleston: BookSurge Publishing, 2007), 25.

214 MacLennan, “Individual Soul and World Soul,” 22.

convincing in light of it providing a cogent explanation for the emergence of lesser daimones, it not only clashes with the orientation of hard polytheists, but is seemingly contradicted in part by an evolutionary process with MacLennan himself discusses elsewhere: the Baldwin effect.

As the superegoic complexes are largely matters of *nurture* over *nature*, being the resultant processes of “behavioral norms acquired during an individual’s lifetime,” it may seem, initially, to stand to reason that this would necessitate that culturally particular Gods form a subspecies of complexes rather than archetypes.²¹⁵ This position is, however, undermined by the Baldwin effect, which is an evolutionary mechanism by which socially conditioned behaviors can, over a substantial period of time, affect a group’s genetic development. Named after James Baldwin (1861–1934), an early 20th century giant in the history of evolutionary psychology, the Baldwin effect can be described as such:

Consider the simple example of a group of organisms suddenly subjected to environmental conditions which their phenotypic plasticity allows them to adapt to through ontogenetic means, perhaps by learning. It might, for instance be a learned dietary preference. These ontogenetic adaptations are not directly inherited and evolved and hence innate; the capacity for forming them, of course, is evolved and inherited. Such indirect adaptations ensure survival over enough generations for chance-based genetic changes to occur which fit with, supplement, or perhaps produce identical phenotypic effects. Eventually such genetic modification would produce the same, or very similar adaptations, and the indirect, ontogenetic adaptations become redundant. The learned dietary preference becomes innate. The initial, indirectly determined, ontogenetic adaptations provide, in effect, a scaffolding that bridges the gap to inherited and evolved direct adaptations.²¹⁶

In other words, the Baldwin effect allows for behavioral patterns which are specific to a population group within a species to incorporate more readily genetic adaptations to their particular physical and social environments, in order to increase their overall evolutionary fitness. That is to say that this effect allows for us to consider the idea that certain population groups are now, after hundreds of generations of conditioning, genetically predisposed to learning norms particular to their group. In Jungian terms, we might say that the Baldwin effect transforms

215 MacLennan, “Evolutionary Jungian Psychology,” 13.

216 Plotkin, 78.

the group superegoic complexes from being culturally conditioned *after the fact* to inherited complexes which are present in group members from birth. MacLennan agrees, stating that “over time, these norms will come to be less learned and more innate; in effect aspects of the culture that have a selective advantage gradually come to be genetically encoded.”²¹⁷ MacLennan, however translates this into theological terms by proposing that even though the daimones are ontologically dependent and subordinate to the Gods, that the Gods learn from those particular daimones which best promote their group’s welfare, thus enabling the Gods to learn from the daimones.²¹⁸ The only problem with *this* theological application of the Baldwin effect is that MacLennan is still treating the Gods involved as those of the *universal* mind. It would seem to me that such adaptations which are specific to the physical and social environments of a genetically endogamous group would engender the emergence of a new subspecies of *phylogenetic* archetypes rather than for the ontogenetic complexes to directly affect the universal collective unconscious. In such a circumstance, we are talking about the collective genome of a homogenous group being altered by a shared culture and landscape over a period of thousands of years. This kind of intraspecies evolution has no *direct* bearing on the evolution of the *human* genome, but has everything to do with the specific evolution of that population group’s genome.

This is of particular importance when we conceptualize the vast spatio-temporal differences that separate different population groups within the human species. The “shrinking” of the world and the bringing together of the various population groups of the world via high speed transportation is an eminently *recent* state of affairs. For *most* of human history, groups have existed, flourished and evolved in geographically separated, endogamous societies. For instance, the Australian Aboriginals are estimated to have migrated to the Australian continent some thirty to forty *thousand* years ago.²¹⁹ Similar migration patterns were followed by the Upper Paleolithic settlers of Europe and Asia as well, creating situations in which humanity, after the African diaspora, evolved in discrete pockets for tens of thousands of years rather than as a whole. During these intervening millennia the Baldwin effect, alongside the standard methods of evolutionary selection discussed previously, would have inevitably resulted in the particularities of those peoples’ landscapes—think, for a moment, of the *tremendous* difference between the endless forests of Paleolithic Europe and the eternal desert of Australia—and cultures being etched upon the genetic coding that is still with us today.²²⁰ What

217 MacLennan, “Evolutionary Jungian Psychology,” 13–14.

218 Ibid., 14.

219 Peter Hiscock, *Archaeology of Ancient Australia*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 22.

220 For a fuller treatment of the link between landscape, language and culture upon the development of a people’s religiosity, please refer to my essay “Why I am a Heathen,” in *The Journal of Contemporary Heathen Thought* 1 (2009): 9–17.

this means in connection with tribal Gods is that, taking into account the Baldwin effect's ability to encode both culture and landscape genetically, is that we might explain theological differences between peoples not as one of culturally conditioned *complexes* but as each group having slightly differentiated *archetypes*.²²¹ To ensure that this process I am proposing is fully understood, let us recapitulate.

MacLennan tells us that the archetypes of the collective unconscious emerge from the individual subconsciouses of humanity. Further, he tells us that the emergent process is mediated by environmental factors, in that we evolve—both genotypically and phenotypically—within an environment of evolutionary adaptiveness. Once this archetypal emergent layer has been established, the repeated interaction between the complexes of the individuals and the universal archetypes result in the bidirectional emergence of a medial layer of superegoic complexes. This bidirectional process of emergence occurs not only within individuals, but also within population groups who share behavioral norms. These group superegoic complexes then, by means of the Baldwin effect, transform the group's individual constituents—imprinting the minds of new generations with culturally particular modes of behavior. From these newly evolved members of the group, now differentiated from the unified genetically homogenous population that immediately followed our anthropogenesis, emerges a *new* collective unconscious—one that is exclusively participated in by members of the group in question. We may still speak of a *universally* collective unconscious, but in light of this group specific differentiation, it becomes something which emerges as a further layer from the archetypes of the collective unconsciouses of *various* independent groups rather than from each individual. Thus, via the Baldwin effect, we are able to account for the emergence of tribal Gods as being ontologically dependent upon their particular peoples in a way that provides a philosophically cogent account of the nature of the connection between the group and that group's Gods that is advocated by ethnic exclusivist polytheists. Thus the theological picture that ultimately presents itself is far closer to the extremely gradated model of Iamblichus than it is to the minimally tiered cosmos of Plotinus and Jung.

The Mind Body Problem

The second point where I shall break slightly from MacLennan's presentation is on the extrapolation of his reversal of the vector of dependency to ontological layers *other* than the psychic. As consistent as MacLennan's work is *within* the

221 This is not to say that culturally specific *images*, Godforms, names, etc. are truly phylogenetic, but rather that broad and subtle differentiations in externalized, instinctive patterns of behavior translate into similarly differentiated, internalized archetypal forms.

psychological domains, he fails to apply the same vectoral reversal to the layers both above and below the *psuchē*. This is not at all to say that his writings *preclude* this, he merely does not explore this avenue of inquiry. As a starting point, the application of MacLennan's Aristotelian transformation of Neoplatonism to the mind-body problem proves quite fruitful. This problem, perennial in contemporary philosophy, can be stated as: "What exactly are the relations between the mental and the physical, and in particular how can there be causal relations between them?"²²² To fully grasp what is meant by this question, some background on its origin will prove beneficial. The mind-body problem as understood in a modern context arose in the middle of the 17th century from the methodology developed by René Descartes during the course of his *Meditations*.²²³ Descartes began his daily meditations by seeking to discover what aspects of his experience could be doubted and which could not. In due course, he concluded that the only thing of which he could be absolutely certain was that *he existed*. His methodical doubt had led him to believe that although he could call into question sensory data received from sight, sound, touch, taste and smell—thinking that there was always the possibility that a præterhuman intelligence was feeding him false data—the very idea that this data would be fed to *him* was predicated upon the existence of Descartes as a thinking subject, in other words, as a mind. Thus, he deduced that the one piece of data which could be trusted was *non-sensory*: the *psuchē*'s experience of itself as a center of subjectivity. Neoplatonists sidestepped this in a way that emergentists cannot explicitly mimic, yet we can *certainly* rectify this gap in MacLennan's philosophy with a contemporary restructuring of the Neoplatonic panpsychism that was discussed earlier.

That being the case, let us explore how contemporary panpsychism is able to respond to the mind-body problem within an emergentist framework that is compatible with MacLennan's analysis. We can begin with the fact that while Descartes' non-sensory, experiential justification for the belief in the reality of one's mind is not only *not* a point of contention between Cartesian dualists and panpsychists, the latter often *explicitly* root their arguments in this very experience.²²⁴ However, what *is* contested by panpsychists is Descartes' train of reasoning which leads from the known existence of mind to a declaration of mind and body being composed of distinct metaphysical substances. It is this idea, that

222 John R. Searle, *Mind: A Brief Introduction*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 11.

223 René Descartes, *The Meditations Concerning First Philosophy* in *Discourse on Method and Meditations*, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur, (1641; repr., USA: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1960), 81.

224 Skrbina's core argument for panpsychism begins: "Mind is real. I know this because I experience it first hand, and I hold it as an indubitable feature of reality," (Skrbina, 254).

mentality and physicality are fundamentally different in an ontological sense that gives rise to the mind-body problem. If such is the case, how can something physical be acted upon by something mental, and vice versa? While Descartes phrased the problem somewhat differently than is done today—questioning how the soul, which was created by God, was able to act upon the body—the question of how the two substances interact still forms the core of the problem which is currently thought of in terms of “how can brain processes produce mental phenomena?”²²⁵ The panpsychist family of philosophies²²⁶ wholly rejects this bifurcation with the position that subjective internality, mentality, is not only a quality that is *incapable* of emerging from pure objective externality, but is common to *all*. Freya Mathews, a prominent contemporary panpsychist, further details panpsychism as “the view that every material object is also a subject,” a position that includes “*any* view that reunites mentality with materiality, and thereby dismantles the foundational dualism of Western thought.”²²⁷ This monistic approach is wholly in line with the Neoplatonic spirit, yet if mentality *cannot* be seen as an emergent quality, how can this thesis operate within MacLennan’s framework?

The answer lies in the pairing of MacLennan’s psychology with the pre-psychic ontology of a breed of panpsychists who arose within the early 20th century Anglo-American philosophical tradition: those who took “pure experience” as the unifying link between mentality and physicality.²²⁸ Panexperientialism (lit. “everything experiences”) is, like the pansensism (lit. “everything senses”) which came before it, a *neutral monist* theory of mind. Under the panexperientialist’s metaphysics, this singular substance that neutral monist metaphysics revolve around is the *event*. Also referred to by Whitehead as *actual entities* or *actual occasions*, these “are the final real things of which the world is made. There is no going behind...[them] to find anything more real.”²²⁹ What Whitehead has done by putting forth the event as the fundamental constituent of reality is to bring Western metaphysics up to speed with Einstein’s special theory of relativity, in which the inseparability of spatiality from temporality results in the space-

225 Searle, 12.

226 It is important to note at this point in the discussion that panpsychism is not a single theory of mind, but is a meta-theory that encompasses a number of specific theories which are at odds with one another. “It is a statement *about* theories, not a theory in itself,” (Skrbina, 2).

227 Freya Mathews, *For Love of Matter: A Contemporary Panpsychism*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), 4.

228 William James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1920), 348.

229 Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, (1927–28; repr., New York: The Free Press, 1985), 18.

time *event* being the elementary unit of analysis.²³⁰ That is to say that, for example, when we speak of John Doe, we are not speaking of John as a spatial object who persists through, but is intrinsically divorced from, time. Rather, the John we are speaking of, of the here and now, is an event—an event which incorporates both spatial extension in the form of his body and temporal extension in the form of his being the present moment’s culmination of a *process* that led to the occurrence of the spacetime event that is John at this moment in time. This insistence on the processual nature of reality and in the primacy of becoming over being is what has earned the thought of Whitehead and his students the moniker of *process philosophy*.

But what has the neutral monism of treating the event as ontologically primary have to do with the nature of mind, or with experience? The answer lies in Whitehead’s conception of the event as being *dipolar* in nature. Dipolarity has the meaning that every event has both a physical and mental pole of experience.²³¹ Taking a human being as an example, we are intimately aware of two aspects of ourselves. That we have an internal, subjective, mental pole is—as Descartes’ phenomenological investigations shewed—not subject to any doubt. That we are also in possession of an external, objective, physical pole is confirmed by our interactions and relations with the world around us. Where the panexperientialist *differs* from Descartes is in the conclusion that these two modes of perception—the internal experience of being a mind, and the external experience of being a body—are manifestations of two distinct substances at play. Nay, the panexperientialist finds that his experience of himself as a self leads him to the conclusion that “mind, in other words, is sheer interiority, matter sheer externality,”—that the two are experiential modalities of *one* organism, not a house divided.²³² What this thesis then entreats us to consider is that dipolarity is not an attribute particular only to humans, or even to animals, but is a universal feature of *all* actual occasions—thus extending an internal dimension of experience to events. This root-level form of experience is *non-sensory* in nature, being the mind’s experience of itself as a mind; this mode of experience is not contingent upon *any* of the five external senses, but is rather a form of pure, unadulterated experience. This non-sensory mode of perception is termed *prehension* by Whitehead, and “is the receptivity...with which every occasion of experience begins.”²³³

230 Edwin F. Taylor and John Archibald Wheeler, *Spacetime Physics: Introduction to Special Relativity*, 2nd ed., (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1992), 10.

231 C. Robert Mesle, *Process-Relational Philosophy: An Introduction to Alfred North Whitehead*, (West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Press, 2008), 100.

232 Mathews, 26.

233 David Ray Griffin, “Archetypal Psychology and Process Philosophy,” 25.

Panpsychism having been thus defined, the two primary alternatives, humanism and mechanism, ought be briefly explored, as even many Jungians will find themselves questioning a thesis that, on its face, seems as outlandish as panexperientialism. Since the time of Descartes, philosophical humanism has been one of the dominant streams of thought in philosophy of mind, and is thus one of the primary sources of “the incredulity with which panpsychism is usually greeted.”²³⁴ The humanist argues that mentality bears three attributes which are exclusively proper to humans: linguistic capacity, reflexive consciousness, and free will.²³⁵ The capability for humans to use language, it is argued, demonstrates that there is a clear distinction between humanity and all other types of life—thus bifurcating nature into two categories: humans and everything else.²³⁶ Similarly do humanists posit that mind is *necessarily* reflexive, that mind is only mind by virtue of being able to be cognizant of its own consciousness. Free will is treated correspondingly, with the humanist proposing that the experience we have of being able to make up our minds and genuinely decide between alternative courses of action is an intrinsic feature of mind, and that this free agency is, again, privy to humankind.²³⁷ The Cartesian humanist believes that “our minds are the source of our freedom, our capacity to choose between alternatives through acts of will that cause our bodily movements. Our bodies, in contrast, are governed by the mechanical laws investigated by the natural sciences.”²³⁸ Thus are all entities aside from men wholly determined in their actions. Inanimate objects are ruled by physical and chemical laws, plants and animals by biological instincts which are merely responses to environmental stimuli. Humanity alone is capable of demonstrating externally (via linguistic ability) and knowing internally (via conscious reflexivity) that their behaviors are exempt from these rigidly determined laws.

The panexperientialist “theory of ‘prehensions’ embodies a protest against the ‘bifurcation’ of nature.”²³⁹ One of the immediate problems that humanistic dualism begets is the sheer improbability of the bifurcation itself. “For humanism, somehow during roughly the past 100,000 years...one species became miraculously endowed with very special features that distinguish it from all that has gone on before.”²⁴⁰ With the specifically Cartesian variety, this presents no major problem, as humanity has been directly endowed with this gift by God with the

234 D.S. Clarke, *Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), 55.

235 Ibid.

236 Searle, 17–18.

237 Ibid., 16.

238 Clarke, 56.

239 Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 289.

240 Clarke, 57.

ensoulment of mankind. However, for those—theists and atheists alike—who are not willing to place a *deus ex machina* kind of explanation at the very core of philosophy of mind, the singular nature of mentality as being distinctly *human* proves a troublesome proposition. Excepting the possibility of divine intervention, how is it *possible* much less *probable* that a wholly divergent substance suddenly came into being and has only done so within a *single* species? And, even *if* such a miraculous event were to occur, the further problem of substantial interaction looms in the distance—the mind-body problem. “All forms of substance dualism inherit Descartes’ problem of how to give a coherent account of the causal relations between the soul and body.”²⁴¹ Descartes attempted to solve this problem of the interaction between the mind and body by theorizing that the pineal gland somehow functioned as a bridge between the two, that “the soul has its principal seat in the little gland.”²⁴² However, as a biological understanding of the pineal gland’s function as the producer of melatonin became understood, Descartes’ notion of it as being the “seat of the soul” quickly fell out of favor.²⁴³

How then, is this substance dualism to be explained? How does a brain, which has no consciousness, no mentality of its own interact with a conscious soul which has been grafted to it? It is a theory which, when compounded with advances in modern physics has become less and less tenable. “Substance dualism seems to imply that there is...[a kind of] mental energy or spiritual energy, that is not fixed by physics,” that is outside of the purview of the laws of thermodynamics, thus rendering them null and void.²⁴⁴ This line of reasoning, finding dualism to be more riddled with problems than answers, has led to its rejection not only by panpsychists, but by materialists as well. If dualism fails, “it is natural to suppose that maybe there is only one kind of thing in the universe,” which is metaphysical *monism*.²⁴⁵ However, the materialistic monism that has largely replaced humanism responds to the mind-body problem in a vastly different way than does the neutral monism of panexperientialism. Rather than *integrate* the bifurcated spheres of mentality and physicality, the materialist *eliminates* the former leaving only matter in its place.

This monistic family of philosophies of mind takes three general forms. Identity

241 Searle, 29.

242 René Descartes, “The Passion of the Soul,” trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross in *The European Philosophers from Descartes to Nietzsche*, ed. Monroe C. Beardsley, (New York: The Modern Library, 1988), 95.

243 Gert-Jan Lokhorst, “Descartes and the Pineal Gland,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pineal-gland/> (accessed February 20, 2011).

244 Searle, 30.

245 Ibid., 33.

theory holds that “mental states are real but that these states are identical with brain states.”²⁴⁶ What this does is to reduce mental activity to neural activity, which deals with both the problem of interaction by accepting only the existence of a single material substance, and with the problem of the mind’s emergence by explaining it wholly in terms of the brain’s evolution. The second class of materialist theories is functionalism, “which argues that mental states are real and that they are identical with a particular ‘process state,’ or state of information.”²⁴⁷ Where functionalism differs from identity theory is that it does not rely on specifically *neural* structures in its definition of mind. Indeed, the functionalist theory applies equally to any sufficiently complex physical system, which makes it the preferred position for proponents of strong artificial intelligence. Lastly, there is the family of eliminativism, which is “the view that mind is somehow imaginary or unreal.”²⁴⁸ This radical theory is, in many ways, the logical consequence of behavioralism, which treats mind as a mistakenly labeled category that is naught but a remnant of pre-scientific ways of thinking about the world. The eliminativist would explain everything in purely physical terms, erasing any reference to the very ideas of consciousness or mentality.

Now, taking these counters to panpsychism into the context of MacLennan’s work, we draw the following conclusions. In opposition to reductive physicalism, MacLennan acknowledges that his combination of Neoplatonism, Jungian psychology and evolutionary theory may appear to be an attempt “to reduce the archetypes and psychical experience to neuroscience, which runs the risk of diminishing the reality of both.”²⁴⁹ Keeping this in mind, MacLennan ensures that his presentation of the overlap between these fields attempts to *enhance* rather than diminish each sphere. His solution “is to hold fast to the phenomena” themselves, for “the ultimate ground of all our judgments of reality is our lived *experience*,” [italics mine].²⁵⁰ In this way, by advocating the primacy of empirical experience over theory, MacLennan anticipates one of panexperientialism’s core arguments. To explain this position further, he states that while evolutionary psychology when applied to the phenomenology of religious experience can certainly glean a certain degree of insight into “the adaptive function of religious behavior,” it must remain mute regarding the internality of the experience itself.²⁵¹ The answer to Cartesian humanism in light of evolutionary psychology is all but standard nowadays. The notion that an evolutionary trait which we readily observe occurring in lesser degrees in our primate cousins is the exclusive property

246 Skrbina, 8.

247 Ibid., 9

248 Ibid.

249 MacLennan, “Evolutionary Jungian Psychology,” 6.

250 Ibid., 7.

251 Ibid.

of *humanity* is all but laughable. Thus, while we *may* be able to speak of the emergence of self-reflective consciousness as a function of correspondingly complex neural systems, the idea that *mind* itself is somehow limited to humanity completely runs afoul of the whole nature of the evolutionary process as being a continuum—an idea which yet again anticipates aspects of panexperientialism.

The Core Argument

What follows is a related group of arguments which are incorporated into what David Skrbina calls the “core argument” for adopting panpsychism. The argument assimilates the following lines of reasoning: the argument from indwelling powers, the argument by continuity, and the argument from non-emergence.²⁵² The first part of the core argument, the indwelling powers section, proposes that “all objects exhibit certain powers or abilities that can plausibly be linked to no-etic qualities.”²⁵³ The argument from indwelling powers is very similar to Descartes’ *cogito* examined previously. This is the argument that the self’s prehension of *itself* as a dipolar subject with mental and physical aspects sufficiently demonstrates the reality and interrelatedness of both mind and body. This argument takes into account our autophenomenological knowledge of our own mental and physical existence as well as our heterophenomenological knowledge of the same reality of external subjects with whom we interact. The indwelling powers argument directly addresses the eliminativist thesis which claims mind is unreal, the idealist thesis of the unreality of the body, as well as dualist theories which posit that there is an ontological separation between the two. Our intimate prehension of our selves is one of holistic unity. We experience ourselves as real, whole centers of subjectivity.

The argument from indwelling powers does not, however, sufficiently demonstrate the *ubiquity* of prehension, and could thus be utilized to prop up a neutral monistic variant of humanism which adhered to the idea of mentality and physicality being polar aspects of one substance but only admitted that dipolarity applied to humanity. Thus, to extend the thesis outwards from ourselves at the center, the argument by continuity is raised. This argument posits that not only are mind and body poles of a common substance, but also that there is an unresolvable problem with attempting to draw a firm line between “enminded and supposedly mindless objects.”²⁵⁴ This argument works in a variety of ways to combat what it views as fallacious dichotomies and mistakenly concretized separations between types. For example, if we accept the indwelling powers argument

252 Skrbina, 250–254.

253 Ibid., 250.

254 Ibid.

and agree that humans are enminded, where is the line drawn between mind bearing humans and mindless apes? As Lamarck himself noted, *all* classificatory systems are fictive in nature.²⁵⁵ That there is some type of distinction between a chimpanzee and a man is not doubted, but that there is an intrinsic distinction between these two groups as discrete classes *is*. All such taxonomic systems are purely *artificial* in nature, and thus cement our understandings of differentiations of continua into discontinuous categories. Thus does the argument by continuity impel us to look backwards in our evolutionary history and see the absurdity of attempting to delimit the point at which we made the transition from being mindless animals whose behaviors were determined to enminded humans with free will. For if the humanist thesis is correct, then there had to have been a discrete point at which this monumental shift occurred. Yet, such a distinction between man and his non-human ancestors is admittedly a fiction—an artificial schema used to pragmatically group differentiations within a continuum. That being the case, the same line of reasoning holds true in determining the transition points between *anything*, for there is a smooth evolutionary continuum that leads from non-living matter to 21st century man. Thus does the continuity argument extend mentality of some form to *all*.

The closely related argument from non-emergence rounds out the core argument for panpsychism. This position proposes that “it is inconceivable that mind should emerge from a world in which no mind existed; therefore mind always existed, in even the simplest of structures.”²⁵⁶ The non-emergence argument attempts to seal up the last gap in this line of argumentation. Even if both the preceding arguments were accepted, it would be possible to argue that mind emerged from non-mind in roughly the same way that humans emerged from non-humans, on a continuous path. What the argument from non-emergence does is to acknowledge that mentality is such that its emergence is impossible. There is a radical and complete difference between the conceptions of a mind-bearing subject with free will and an inert object whose actions are absolutely determined. The difference is so great that the humanists erected an ontological wall between the two—so great that the materialists eliminated mind and free agency entirely. In arguments from non-emergence, the mental property of *novelty* or *spontaneity* takes center stage. Novel behavior is behavior that cannot be predicted by physical laws. It “is that which is done from the point of view of the organism,” and is the mental attribute that manifests itself as the freedom to make true decisions between courses of action—decisions that are not purely the con-

255 Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, *Zoological Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Elliot, (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1963), 19.

256 Skrbina, 250.

sequences of genetic and environmental factors.²⁵⁷ We know, internally, that this is an attribute we are in possession of, yet is it sensible to conceive of novelty emerging from its absence? Panpsychists would claim that “it is a contradiction in terms to assume that some explanatory fact can float into the actual world out of nonentity,” and that novelty is such a fundamental central *fact* of the human experience that the very notion of its emergence is nonsensical.²⁵⁸

These three arguments come together in an interwoven manner to form the core argument, which we can now articulate as follows.²⁵⁹ Mind is real; we experience it as an inseparable, intrinsic aspect of ourselves. Our bodies are real; we experience them as we experience the mind, as perceiving extensions of the prehending mental cores of our beings. We do not experience any manner of bifurcation between the two, but experience mentality and physicality as singular, unified wholes. We know that some parts of our physicality are unique (e.g. our human forms are particular to humans, our mammalian features are particular to mammals, etc.), but our physical nature itself is universal; *all* that we encounter can be interacted with as physical objects. We also know that some parts of our mentality are unique, as with the body, yet the principle of continuation that holds true for physicality holds true for mentality as well—entreating us to think that a facility for prehension is universal as well. Since our mentality and physicality are intrinsically connected and experienced as dipolar faces of a single entity, so can we assume this is the case for all. Further, complete and total difference between the novelty that we experience as being conterminous with our mentality is so radically different from its absence, determinism, that its emergence is inconceivable. “Therefore, panpsychism must be true. QED.”²⁶⁰

Objections to Panpsychism

The case for panpsychism being such, the principle objection to the panpsychist position is its implausibility. As Clarke asks, are we, in adopting panpsychism, going to propose that thermostats have minds in the same way that we have minds?²⁶¹ Panpsychist responses to this critique differ wildly, with some stronger forms of animism²⁶² and hylozoism²⁶³ answering in the *affirmative*. However, the

257 Clarke, 124.

258 Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 46.

259 Skrbina, 254.

260 Ibid.

261 Clarke, 4.

262 Animism, from the Latin *anima* (a translation of the Greek *psuchē*), is the belief that the soul is not limited to humans, but is possessed by all kinds of natural objects such as rivers, trees, boulders, etc.

263 Hylozoism, from the Greek *hylē* (ὕλη—“matter” or lit. “wood”) and *zōē* (ζωή—“liv-

panexperientialism this paper seeks to defend counters this charge with its very definition of mentality. Panexperientialism is not proposing that the kind of complex consciousness that is manifest in humanity is any more omnipresent than is our particular material configuration. Indeed, this part of the panexperientialist theory is upheld entirely by Jungian psychology. As we remember from Jung, the *conscious* mind is but a single facet of human mentality, with the vaster portions being *unconscious*. The interconnectedness of the material and mental means that the more unified and persistent the physical organization of the entity in question is, then the more complex will the object's mental organization be.²⁶⁴ The prehension that panexperientialism posits to be universal is the mental equivalent of what a fundamental particle is to matter. It is the primary core from which all mental structures of advanced evolution are built. That all objects apprehend no more makes them conscious in the same way that we are than does the fact that all are made of the same fundamental particles make them able to taste or smell the way that we do. Prehension is the internal relatedness of the object to the world around it. It "denotes the bare process of seizing, excluding extraneous notions of...consciousness."²⁶⁵ However, it is only in what Whitehead calls *compound individuals*—"that is, a sentient individual composed of lower-order individuals such as cells, molecules, atoms, and ultimately 'occasions of experience,'" that we find something relatable to the human mind.²⁶⁶ We find, again, that this definition of mentality as prehensive largely fits with Jung's notion of the way in which the unconscious responds to external stimuli. The only *real* distinction, then, that we see between the human *psychē* and that of any other self-organizing system is the internal complexity of the psychic complexes that emerge.

The second objection, which itself emerges from considerations of the first, is namely: what is the distinction between compound individuals like humans or dogs who obviously are self-organized, mind-bearing subjects, and aggregates like a pile of sand or a garage which, although formally complex, are somehow distinct from *true* individuals? This is a serious problem and if not addressed properly threatens to give rise to an ontological dualism between individuals and aggregates that is just as metaphysically damning as is the mind-body dualism of Descartes. It is here, again, that the concept of the continuum comes into play. The difference between an individual and an aggregate is, according to Griffin,

ing" or "life"), was embodied in the beliefs of thinkers as disparate as Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus in an *inherently animated* universe whose fundamental substance(s) teemed with life.

264 Clarke, 1.

265 Elizabeth M. Krause, *The Metaphysics of Experience: A Companion to Whitehead's "Process and Reality,"* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 16.

266 Skrbina, 244.

not an *ontological* duality, but “only an *organizational duality*.”²⁶⁷ So, we might say that “the rock has experience *in* it—the primitive animist was this far correct; but the *rock itself*, considered as a whole, has no experience over and above that of its molecular parts.”²⁶⁸ Though a rock and a man are both collections of *actual occasions*, the latter displays a degree of self-regulatory homeostasis and unity that the former does not. Although, as the rock *does* display *some* of these attributes, we can say that the two exist on a continuum of individuality—that, rather than a “true” individual being something wholly different from an aggregate, that there is a fluid boundary between the two. The simpler a system, the simpler and more reactive the mind. The more complex systems carry more internal differentiation and capacity for complex mental behavior.

A third objection arises from the panexperientialist’s insistence on the ubiquity not only of prehension but also of novelty and spontaneity. This objection is really the mirror opposite of the objection to mechanism’s complete denial of novelty in favor of determinism. The mechanist would counter the panexperientialist’s assertion by questioning that if *all* events, excepting the already contested example of humans, are novel in nature then why do physical laws as fixed stabilities appear to govern the world. To this, the panexperientialist would argue that these laws are *not* fixed, that “the laws of nature...are merely transitory stabilities that emerge at one phase of cosmic history only to lapse from creation and give way to variant modes of operation in the fullness of time.”²⁶⁹ And, while “all genuine individuals have at least some iota of freedom...higher-grade, more evolved individuals have more freedom: cells more than molecules, psyches more than cells, human psyches more than chimpanzee psyches.”²⁷⁰ This gradation of capacity for novel behavior must also take into account the nature of conditioning. Prehensions, moments of experience, are conditioned by their past—they are, in their capacity as instances of pure receptivity, uniquely open to the continuingly patterned influences of their past actions upon their future courses.²⁷¹ So, while novelty *does* pervade the real in the same way that materiality and prehension does, its manifestational strength is contingent upon the internal complexity and level of self-organization in the organism being considered.

Process Ontology

267 Griffin, 24.

268 Ibid.

269 Nicholas Rescher, *Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), 91.

270 Griffin, 26.

271 Ibid.

If then, we accept the panexperientialist thesis, and apply it to MacLennan's emergent restructuring of Neoplatonism, what are the ramifications? The metaphysical, and specifically ontological, consequences of panexperientialism's truth are embodied in process philosophy's insistence on the primacy of the actual occasion or event as reality's fundamental building block. The large scale outgrowth of this idea is manifest in the supposition that process affords the most effective conceptual tool with which to understand the world—that *all* things are reducible to processes.²⁷² Thus do the process philosophers present us not with a world *that changes*, but with a world *that is itself change*. Rather than seeing the world as a collection of objects, it is seen as a sea of interrelated processes—all of which seethes with mentality and novelty. While MacLennan's work, as presented thus far, seems completely in accord with this kind of foundational ontology, his treatment of numerical archetypes forms the basis for my third disagreement with him.

After detailing the ways in which the Gods evolve and change, he says: “so we must exclaim πάντα ῥεῖ²⁷³ and agree with Heraclitus that Pythagoras had much learning but little understanding? I think not.”²⁷⁴ Although he indeed does posit that the human genome—and thus the personified Gods—is in a state of evolutionary flux, he further proposes that “behind the Gods are the divine numbers, the more abstract, impersonal archetypal Ideas, which are the psychical aspects of natural law.”²⁷⁵ This higher class of archetypes is not something about whose *existence* I disagree, but I find his downward extrapolation of the fixity of this layer of the hierarchy down to the ontological foundation to be troubling. Certainly, we can agree that numbers and mathematical laws do *not* change, and are the very definitions of eternity and stability. However, is the proper way to deal with this fact to engage in a metaphysical juxtaposition of Aristotelian realism regarding *most* archetypes and Platonic realism regarding a *few* archetypes really the correct path to resolution? I think not. This is a situation in which we must make a choice between one mode of ontological constitution: top-down or bottom up. There is no room for *both*.

With that in mind, how might Aristotle's theory of universals apply to mathematical entities? Similar to all other instances we have examined to this point, it would derive universals, in this case numbers, from particulars. And as mathematics is, as it is often described, the language of nature, we find instantiations of number all around us, at every conceivable level of the hierarchy. Indeed, des-

272 Rescher, 28.

273 *Panta rhei*, “everything changes,” was the Pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus' most famous saying, (Copleston, *Greece and Rome*, 39).

274 MacLennan, “Evolution, Jung, and Theurgy,” 16.

275 Ibid.

cending all the way to the *bottom* of the emanative hierarchy, we find that the foundation of reality is a plenary field of events. For as Whitehead writes, “there is a becoming of continuity, but no continuity of becoming,” meaning that the ontologically prime layer of reality is one of quantized differentiation; “thus the ultimate metaphysical truth is atomism.”²⁷⁶ This atomic nature of reality’s root hypostasis means that the principles of numeration are found in the ontological beginnings of the world. In this way, just as the archetypes of the collective unconscious are universal abstractions of human instantiations, so are the numerical archetypes abstracted from particulars that are themselves ontologically primary. In this way we may retort that yes, *πάντα ῥεῖ* indeed! *All* of the events that comprise this primary layer are in process. The event is a fundamentally processual unit. And, as all higher layers which emerge from this root system are ultimately built up from change it is indeed true that, in a way, everything changes. It is, however, just as true to maintain that the numerical archetypes *are* the embodiments of fixity and are—insofar as anything at all exists—eternal and unchanging. The very principles of quantization and differentiation could not *but* cause numerical abstractions to emerge. The fundamentally atomic nature of the world necessitates this.

This adoption of process ontology as a foundation for MacLennan’s Aristotelian recasting of Neoplatonism has, however, yet another dramatic ramification. So far we have spoken of the medial layers of the humans and Gods, and of the plenary bottom of the hierarchy that is the event field. What, then of the top? As we discussed earlier, at the top of the Neoplatonic hierarchy sat the One, the divine principle of unity from which all subsequent hypostases emanated. But, as we have just explained, the numerical archetypes, by virtue of their emanative constitution, *cannot* occupy this position. Quite the opposite, in fact, turns out to be the case, with “oneness” being an emergent attribute of each and every of the *lowest* constituents of the hierarchy. This being the case, what is the *ultimate* emergent layer? In this instance we shall, as in the reshaping of panpsychism to suit our current needs, do the same for the panentheistic top entity in Neoplatonism’s emanative chain.

There are, however, several tremendous differences between the Classical conception of a panentheistic deity and the picture that emergentism presents. The first, and most dramatic, of these is that within such a model this God is *not* ontologically primary. This is a gigantic leap away from the category of the ultimate in emanative theologies, where the One was seen as both ontologically prime *and* metaphysically greatest. Emergentism necessitates that these two attributes *cannot* be shared by one entity, as the occupy polar opposite ends of the hierarch-

276 Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 35.

ical continuum. While this type of theology does result in a model which is largely incompatible with strict monotheism—and is likely why subsequent panentheistic theologians, nearly all of whom have been Christian, have not espoused it—it does *not* intrinsically clash with polytheism, making it the natural expression of the ultimate for a polytheistic theology which seeks to express itself in concert with the emanative and evolutionary processes of the middle realms.

This being the case, let us flesh out this final layer somewhat. As mentioned previously, panentheism is distinguished from both Classical theism and pantheism by the way in which it treats the ultimate deity as both immanent *and* transcendent. This unity of seeming opposites is achieved, in our emanative system, by the fact that this God is the subject who ultimately emerges from the complete totality of *all*. Indeed, “panentheism affirms that although God and the world are ontologically distinct and God transcends the world, the world is ‘in’ God ontologically.”²⁷⁷ This is radically different from the Classical theistic position that achieves distinctness and transcendence by erecting an ontological wall of separation between God and the world. It is just as different from the pantheistic view that God is *not* transcendent, but, by virtue of being *identical* with the world, is wholly immanent. The key difference between these theologies and panentheism is that *both* Classical theism and pantheism treat God as *non-emergent*. In this way, the kind of bottom-up panentheism is really the only kind of ultimate theological principle that *can* spring forth from an emergentist philosophy. So, if we think of a cell as emerging from atomic systems, human bodies emerging from cellular systems, and the planet Earth as emerging from combinations of geological and biotic systems, we can extrapolate this process upwards to conceive of the panentheistic deity as the individual who emerges from the totality of galactic processes. For this being, the whole fabric of the cosmos would be her body, and the mentality which would emerge would necessarily incorporate levels of such emergent complexity that it would bear as much similarity to what *we* think of as mind as our own consciousness does to the internality of a lepton. So great would the gulf of complexification be between she and us that to speak of her as ineffable even seems inadequate. This complete and total degree of abstraction goes *far* beyond Paul’s adjuration of the “Unknown God,”²⁷⁸ and places at the world’s pinnacle a deity who is all but *unknowable*.

Yet for all this transcendent greatness, panentheism brings the deity just as close to us as it is far. The emergent nature of this relationship, however, calls for a reversal of several key attributes commonly applied to metaphysically ultimate

²⁷⁷ Cooper, 18.

²⁷⁸ Acts 17:23.

deities. First, the idea that God made the world; the emergent position would completely reverse this, treating God as being constituted *by* the world. Just as man cannot without his body exist, neither can the panentheistic deity *be* without the universe as her external form. Second, the notion that pervades both Classical theism and Plotinian Neoplatonism, that the ultimate can be immediately prehended by the soul without first traversing the myriad of intermediary emergences does not seem to be compatible with this type of deity. Rather, the Iamblican notion of the levels of the hierarchy being akin to steps on a staircase that one must climb *one at a time* rings true. Third, the conception of the ultimate as being *singular* needs a theological readjustment. In this way rather than there existing a sole deity who is at once ontologically primary and metaphysically ultimate, we find ourselves with a dyadic system. This dipolar model which leaves us with a base level ultimate category of pure fluxating becoming and a top level category of emergent totality bears far more similarity to the pre-Platonic conception of the world's beginning being rooted in the interplay between Nyx (Νύξ—"night") and Chaos (Χάος—"the first state of the universe"). Reaching back to Hesiod's *Theogony*,²⁷⁹ we find that in the beginning there was only Chaos, the God of pure fluxating novelty, and from Chaos emerged Nyx, the Goddess whose body is the night sky. With a bit of poetic license it is not *too* hard to see this as a mythological expression whose application is quite appropriate to the cosmology painted by this interpretation of process philosophy. At the root level of reality seethes Chaos, the plenary God of indeterminate novelty and becoming—the God whose very form is a myriad of atomic microprocesses all in a constant state of flux. And, at the top level sits Nyx, the Goddess of the night sky, whose body encompasses the cosmos—she whose being contains the intergalactic whole. In such a system it is *He* of whom we are made, and *She* within whom "we live, and move, and have our being."²⁸⁰

Theurgic Ramifications

The model being such, what implications does this Aristotelian reversal of the vector of ontological dependency have on the theory behind and the practice of theurgy? As the shift from emanation to emergence leaves the psychic layers more or less in tact, changing only the ways in which they are constituted, much of the accompanying lower theurgy also requires no theoretical change. Praxical changes among contemporary psychonauts and theurgists are generally less geared around the theory behind what one is doing and much more around the efficacy of the practice itself. That is to say that, although the practice of constructing the *augoeides ochēma* was thought, by the ancient Greeks, to literally

²⁷⁹ Hesiod, 87.

²⁸⁰ Acts 17:28 (KJV).

allow the theurgist's soul to leave his body and traverse the higher worlds, contemporary practitioners tend towards far less literal interpretations, treating the out of body experience as a subspecies of lucid dream.²⁸¹ So, in this instance, the practices used to induce such an experience would, owing to the near identical nature of human psychology between the ancients and ourselves, be all but identical, but the theoretical explanation of the experience's phenomenology would differ somewhat. In other words, the *how* does not change, but our understanding of the *what* does. A prime example of this is in the aforementioned Neoplatonic practice, where the ancient theurgists believed themselves to have left their physical bodies behind and traveled into the higher levels of the hierarchy by means of the subtle body. This idea, leaving behind of the physical, *does* stem from the emanative notion of the physical as being the lowest emanation. However, for one working within the emergent paradigm, it is understood that the physical body and world can never be disregarded, and that higher spiritual experiences are themselves *contingent* upon the presence of the body. If the higher is birthed by the lower, and is constituted by it, to "leave" the lower would make the prehension of the higher impossible. So, in this way, the contemporary theurgist who operates within the intellectual backdrop of evolutionary Jungian psychology would likely see such experiences of lucidity as intrinsically tied to neural activity, not as something that can be divorced from bodily processes as did the ancients.

Keeping in mind this ontological primacy of the body over the higher forms of mentality, it would seem to follow that the modern theurgist would see physical health and well-being not as incidental to, but as an imperative aspect of the higher modes of theurgy. This is in *stark* contradistinction to the ascetic practices that evolved in concert with the world's emanation theologies. Even today, it is not uncommon for a Hindu *sādhu*, holy man, to perform all manner of bodily mortifications that result in the permanent loss of fitness and health.²⁸² Ascetics of the Shaiva denomination are particularly well known for performing the *urdhva* mortification which involves holding up one arm for years at a time—a process which is believed to aid in spiritual ascent but inevitably results in the atrophying and eventual loss of the arm.²⁸³ This, then, would be an instance where our Aristotelian perspective results in a change in practice *and* theory, as an emanative theurgy must be built upon a physical foundation. This leads us to agree fully with Teilhard's statement that in regards to spiritual practice, "what is involved firstly, is the care and improvement of the human body, the health and

281 A lucid dream is where the dreamer becomes conscious of the fact that he is dreaming while maintaining the dream state.

282 Dolf Hartsuiker, *Sadhus: India's Mystic Holy Men*, (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 1993), 11.

283 *The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism*, c.v. "urdhva"

strength of the organism,” for “thought can only be built up on this material basis.”²⁸⁴ Under this model, then, the *psuchē* could not be treated as detached and separate from the body, but rather must be seen as something which emerges from it, thus resulting in some sort of comprehensive fitness regimen being a necessary precursor to any higher theurgic work.

Certain aspects of other lower theurgic practices such as *telestikē* and *katochē* would require theoretical adjustments as well. In both cases, what the theurgist was, in the Classical world, thought to be dealing with was the descent of a God or daimon into the physical world via the temporary habitation of a statue, child, etc. In contemporary terms, we would not speak of such an event as happening wholly *without* but nearly entirely *within*. In other words, when the theurgist prepares the statue for the *telestikē* operation and succeeds in calling down the God or daimon to the physical, this is not a case of an entity who exists in complete ontological separation from the theurgist literally inhabiting a statue and entering into conversation with him. Rather, we would make use of Jung’s understanding of the processes of archetypal possession and projection. In such an event, the theurgist would be possessed by the entity he has invoked, but in order for his ego complex to converse with this higher complex or archetype, he would *project* this possession onto an object external to him—thus allowing these two compartments of his *psuchē* to engage in a dialogue with one another as mutually autonomous entities. Jung considered this type of practice to be an integral aspect of the individuation process, terming it *active imagination*.²⁸⁵

Regarding the *higher* theurgy, we see that the theoretical changes become even more pronounced. As mentioned in the preceding section, our presently examined model presents the ultimate in *duotheistic* rather than monotheistic terms, with the ontologically primary forming the hierarchy’s base and the metaphysically greatest occupying the top position. Correspondingly, to describe the highest levels of theurgic *henōsis*, we will need to refer to *two* modes of prehension, not one. As discussed before, the Neoplatonic One was at once both ontologically prime and metaphysically supreme. Beginning at the bottom, we can attempt to provide a rough sketch of the methodology and phenomenology of the prehension of the atomic plenum at the hierarchy’s base. Panexperientialism tells us that “consciousness is a later emergent phenomenon of experience which highlights certain aspects of it but cannot in any way be exhaustive of it.”²⁸⁶ To understand what an experience of this pre-conscious root level would entail, we

284 Teilhard, 282.

285 MacLennan, “Individual Soul and World Soul,” 15.

286 Ernest L. Simmons Jr., “Mystical Consciousness in a Process Perspective,” in *Process Studies* 14, no. 1 (Spring 1984), <http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2585> (accessed June 18, 2011).

must take into account the two modes of perception that Whitehead's panexperientialism proposes: presentational immediacy and causal efficacy.

Presentational immediacy is clear and distinct and presents to our awareness the immediate "buzzing" confusion of the world around us. It is the "there" and "now" element in human perception. Causal efficacy, on the other hand, while being more massive as the conformation of our experience to the reality of the past as it impinges upon the present, is also vague and a fairly indiscriminating mode of perception. Causal efficacy is the more fundamental mode, however, for it is the perception through which the interconnectedness and causal influence of one actuality upon another is experienced.²⁸⁷

In other words, perception in the mode of causal efficacy takes into account the causal webs of dependency and emergence that present us with the coherent and "finished" picture of reality that is the hallmark of everyday consciousness. Presentational immediacy is quite different, disregarding such logical connectors and being more of a direct prehension of an event *qua* event. What this means for theurgy is that since our ontologically primary deity is *not* the being *qua* being of the Neoplatonists, but the Whiteheadian *event*, the corresponding prehension would be a downwardly directed process of phenomenological reduction in which the mode of causal efficacy is, by means of various methodologies proper to meditation, gradually shaken off. Indeed, the method of *Rāja yoga* presented by Patañjali (2nd century BC) is the model of perfection for the theurgist attempting to reduce his prehensive mode to that of pure experience.²⁸⁸ This yogic method begins with the practice of a particular posture (*āsana*) and breath control (*prāṇāyāma*) designed to allow the mind to focus on the act of prehension, and to not be bothered by agitations of the body. The resulting physical state resembles the kind of complete unawareness of one's physical presence that accompanies sleep. This physical practice is paired with mental training which begins by teaching the student to examine in impassive detail one's mental contents (*pratyahara*), to fully concentrate upon an object (*dhāraṇā*), to concentrate so fully that the ego is eclipsed by the experience of the object of one's concentration (*dhyāna*), and finally to penetrate into the truly ontologically primary mode of prehending experience itself as such, in its pure state (*samādhi*).²⁸⁹

287 Ibid.

288 Swāmi Vivekananda, *Rāja Yoga*, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, & Co., Ltd.), 17.

289 Ibid.

On the completely opposite end of the hierarchy, the praxical methods leading towards the metaphysically highest would necessarily be completely different, as such an experience would *not* be one of presentational immediacy, but rather of the causal efficacy of the *whole*. In other words, whereas the kind of *henōsis* proper to the hierarchy's bottom would, by virtue of our recasting of the Neoplatonic hierarchy, be one in which consciousness is focused and contracted to the point of it being eclipsed by the experience of the object of concentration, the *henōsis* of the uppermost layer would be attained in the exact opposite fashion, via the *expansion* of one's consciousness. In this way, the traditional practices of theurgic ascent comport quite nicely, beginning with the assimilation into one causal picture the daimonic contents of one's own *psuchē*, following with the complete assimilation of the theistic archetypal field, resulting in the identification of the theurgist with the *Anthrōpos*, or higher self. This, then, if the process of prehensive expansion and integration were continued would keep building in upon itself by assimilating higher and vaster levels of the metaphysical hierarchy into a singular causal picture, the end result of which would be the prehension of the Great Goddess herself: Our Lady of Infinite Spacetime—the greatest of all Goddesses of whom we catch but a fleeting glimpse when we lose ourselves in transfixed wonder while gazing upwards at the night sky.

Recapitulation

And so ends this paper's journey. We began with the purpose of fully exploring the ramifications of MacLennan's Aristotelian recasting of the emanative vector of ontological dependency on the doxa and praxes of Classical Neoplatonism. After first detailing the Neoplatonic metaphysics of Plotinus and the theology and theurgy of Iamblichus, we compared this with the psychology and psychiatry of Carl Jung, finding the two systems to be, excepting lexical differences, largely descriptions of the same set of phenomena. Following this, Jung's psychology was examined in light of contemporary advances in evolutionary psychology. The paper's focal point, MacLennan's work, synthesizes all of this, resulting in an Aristotelian inversion of the Neoplatonic vector of ontological dependency, resulting in a shift from metaphysical emanationism to emergentism. Finding MacLennan's model to be deficient in certain areas, this work was supplemented with excursions into Whiteheadian process philosophy. The resultant picture which emerged from this synthetic process was one of a hierarchical cosmos whose layers are ordered in a bottom-up fashion which is driven by the twin processes of emergence and evolution. At the hierarchy's ontologically primary root system is the plenary field of events, which provides the system with an overarching *process* orientation. From these atomic microprocesses emerge further layers of ever increasing complexity and internal homeostasis, eventually reaching the medial layer which *we* occupy. This layer begins with the physical found-

ation of our bodies, from whose neural systems emerge the complex form of mentality that is humanity's hallmark. However, we also, via the infusion of Whitehead's process ontology, have discovered that the emergence of such mental systems is *not* synonymous with the emergence of mentality, for the event-oriented metaphysics are by necessity panexperientialist. This medial layer of *psuchē* is populated by strictly ordered hierarchies of several types of daimons and Gods, the constellation of whom forms the mindscapes of individual humans, families, ethnicities and humanity as a whole. Continuing upwards from this point, the hierarchical system culminates with the logical conclusion of emergent panentheism. Taken as a whole, it is my hope that the model presented provides a system which is capable of encompassing our everyday experience of the world, our heterophenomenological scientific understandings of the world's physical and biological processes, as well as our autophenomenological experiences of pluralistic religious truth into a holistic, consistent account. It is in this way, by applying a rigorously multi-disciplinary analysis to phenomena of polytheistic religiosity, that I believe an overarching idea of such can "be so formulated as to preserve, perhaps even increase, its religious value, while yet avoiding the contradictions which seem inseparable from the idea as customarily defined."²⁹⁰

Epistle to the Heathen

The Heathen, after reading this far, may still find himself questioning not only the *relevance* but also the *applicability* of such a study to the beliefs and practice of Heathenry in the modern world. First among these concerns is likely to be the sneaking suspicion that this paper is advocating the establishment of a kind of Heathen orthodoxy. It has long been my experience that a significant portion of Heathendom is possessed by a *strong* libertarian streak and reacts with extraordinary vigor against ideas which are seen as embodying the same kind of rigid intellectual dogmatism that was perceived to have been in place in the religions which they either belonged to or within whose community they grew up prior to converting to Heathenry.²⁹¹ This is not, however, a fear I intend to pla-

290 Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), 1.

291 A perfect example of this kind of knee-jerk reaction to the very *idea* of a Heathen dogma can be found in Mark Stinson's collection of essays, *Heathen Gods* (Liberty, MO: Jotun's Bane Kindred, 2009). In "Reasons I'm Heathen," he states that one of the attractive features of Heathenry (versus Christianity) is that "there is no central authority or codified dogma used to control believers," (20). The same sentiment is repeated in "Differing Views Within Heathenry," where Stinson states that "there is no central authority, no all-encompassing dogma to follow," within Heathenry (31). In the same essay he expands on this with the statement that "there is no real benefit

cate. This paper *does* present a theological position that I am more than comfortable to characterize as having the potential to be orthodox. Now, before you turn away in disgust, let us explore exactly what orthodoxy means and why it is not only *already* present in the sapling that is Heathen theology, but why it must become a *more pronounced* feature of our thought if Heathenry is to actualize its potentiality and grow once more to be a mighty oak.

The term itself stems from the Greek roots, *orthos* (ὀρθός—“true,” “right,” or “straight”) and *doxa* (δόξα—“an opinion,” “judgment,” or “belief”). These two roots come together to create an impression of a set of beliefs, generally that pertain to religious matters, that are correct or *true*. There is a common misconception that an orthodoxy *must* rest upon some sort of religious authority, but, in actuality, that could not be further from the truth. While there are indeed a number of religious organizations whose orthodoxic precepts make, when questioned, an appeal to either a textual or clerical authority, it should be understood that this mode of justification is a particular type of fallacy of defective induction.²⁹² Known as the *argumentum ad verecundiam* (lit. “argument to authority”), this fallacy is one of the most commonly encountered, yet most obviously fallacious forms of argumentation. Its form can be explained as such:

1. A claims that B is true.
2. A is an authority.
3. Therefore, B is true.

While this argumentative structure certainly does not *preclude* the possibility of B being true, it is fundamentally false to claim B’s truth based solely on A’s authority. To concretize the example, we can flesh it out:

1. Stephen Hawking claims that black holes exist.
2. Stephen Hawking is an authority on theoretical physics.
3. Therefore, black holes exist.

to suppressing local tribal beliefs, traditions, and practices in favor of an over-arching unifying dogma,” (32). This aversion to religious orthodoxy is not unique to Stinson, but seems to be representative of *many* who have converted to Heathenry from religions with strong orthodoxic precepts (e.g. Roman Catholicism). However, this seems to be more of a species of cognitive bias, where new Heathens are quick to distinguish their new faith from the old in as many ways as possible, with no regard as to the broader theological ramifications or internal consistency of these reactionary beliefs.

292 “Argumentum Ad Verecundiam,” *Introduction to Logic*, <http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/authority.html> (accessed July 19, 2011).

While propositions one and two are indeed true, nothing about them *necessitates* that the conclusion is true, making the argument—regardless of the truth or falsity of the conclusion—formally false. What the fallacy comes down to is that an authoritative *doxa* is only as true as the *evidence* upon which it is founded. In theology’s case—particularly in the United States—far too often are so-called “revealed” or “inspired” texts taken to be, in and of themselves, authoritative. Philosophically, this is an irrevocably flawed process of thought, as the doxic points in any given religious text cannot cogently be argued to be true unless those points can themselves be argued in favor of by means of argumentation other than “God says it’s true.” While Heathens are *generally* not in the habit of claiming theological propositions to be true or false on the sole basis of “Óðinn said so,” there *is* a particular variation on the appeal to authority that is not uncommon: the argument from *historical* authority.²⁹³ This variant’s form may be demonstrated thusly:

1. Pre-Christian Heathens believed A to be true.
2. The historicity of A is authoritative.
3. Therefore, A is true.

While the second proposition is generally implied rather than explicitly stated, the argument’s form is the very definition of a classic *argumentum ad verecundiam*. In this way, it would be irreparably flawed for a Heathen theologian to argue, for instance, that Óðinn exists simply because of the historical fact that Heathens in ancient times believed it to be so. Arguments must be rooted in one or both of the two following epistemological categories:

1. Empirical Data²⁹⁴
2. Rational Thought²⁹⁵

In respect to theological arguments, St. Anselm’s (1033–1109) ontological argu-

293 An example of this can be found in Bil Linzie’s essay, “Reconstructionism’s Role in Modern Heathenry,” (<http://www.angelfire.com/nm/seidhman/reconstruction-c.pdf> [accessed July 1, 2011]) where he states that he began promoting reconstructionism versus the (largely unacknowledged) syncretism that was the hallmark of 20th century Heathenry because he believed that Heathenry “should be rebuilt on historical fact and that by encouraging this we were stepping forward to support its validity in the modern world,” (2).

294 *A posteriori* knowledge is gathered from experience and the collection of empirical evidence (e.g. there are two apples on the table).

295 *A priori* knowledge is epistemologically primary, meaning that its knowing is thought to be independent of experience (e.g. one apple plus another apple equals two apples).

ment²⁹⁶ is *the* exemplar of rational theology, while Thomas Aquinas' cosmological argument²⁹⁷ fills a similar position in that it is among the most established of all empirical theological arguments. At this point, the second question against the paper might be raised: why resort to these mental gymnastics *at all*? After all, if our ancestors had no formal philosophy or theology, why should we import these anachronistic patterns of thought into what is supposed to be a *reconstructed* religion? The answer again lies in the necessity of orthodoxy—of *true* belief. It does us no good as a religion to hold beliefs which are either inconsistent with scientific consensus or that are internally inconsistent. For a belief to be *correct*, it ought correspond to reality—to the way things are. This mode of orthodox theology simply cannot be reached by solely relying on the phase of religious development that simply happens to be the source of Heathen textual and archaeological documentation. In adopting these beliefs at face value, not only is one committing the grave error of making an argument from authority, but it is also the case that the specific beliefs being adopted were developed prior to the emergence of true rationality among the peoples of Northern and Western Europe,

296 Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God is composed of the following chain of propositions:

1. We can conceive of something which has the property of maximal greatness.
2. When this conception (1) is conveyed, it is understood.
3. Thus (1 and 2), this conception (1) exists in our understanding.
4. Maximal greatness cannot be conceived of in understanding alone.
5. That which can be conceived of in our understanding can also be conceived of as existing in reality.
6. Reality is greater than understanding.
7. Thus (4, 5 and 6), maximal greatness conceived of *as existent* is greater than the same being conceived of in understanding alone.
8. Thus (3 and 7), maximal greatness is, by definition, existent.
9. That being having the property of maximal greatness is God.
10. Therefore, God exists (Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion*, trans. William Mann, from Graham Oppy's "Ontological Arguments," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/> [accessed June 19, 2011]).

297 The Thomist version of the cosmological argument can be broken down into the following form:

1. Things in the world are in motion.
2. All things in motion were put in motion by an ontologically antecedent mover.
3. The mover which put the thing in question into motion must itself have been moved by a similarly prior mover.
4. This sequential causation cannot proceed indefinitely.
5. Therefore, there must exist an ontologically primary unmoved mover, understood to be God (Scott David Foutz, "An Examination of Thomas Aquinas' Cosmological Argument as Found in the Five Ways," in *Quodlibet Journal*, <http://www.quodlibet.net/aqu5ways.shtml> [accessed June 19, 2011]).

making such beliefs hardly worth adopting as literal truths. The Christian conversions occurred while our ancestors were still in the pre-philosophical phases of their intellectual development. They had not yet reached the levels that the Greeks or Indians had, and so did the conversions contort this eventual development into a kind of pseudomorphosis—forcing European thought to develop within an imported Christian framework.

As Stephen McNallen²⁹⁸ and Collin Cleary²⁹⁹ have both pointed out, none of this is to say that much of this cannot be *reclaimed* and applied to Heathen theology with great effect. Indeed, quite the opposite is true; Heathen theology is at such an infantile state of development at present that the ways in which this development can be guided by established philosophical schools are all but innumerable. At some point in the future we may be able to speak of existential, process-relational, or even eco-feminist *schools* of Heathen theology in the same way that other major religions do. Yet, without the intentional development of the seed-ideas that the faith of our ancestors presents us, we will remain locked into either a primitivist understanding of Heathenry as a static, historical relic, incapable of doxic development, *or* continue down the path of libertarian fragmentation where everyone believes what they want to believe and deal with the contradictory beliefs of others not by attempting to determine *which* theology is true, but by resorting to an epistemologically relativistic theological framework in which it is socially unacceptable for a theologian to publicly claim his position to be correct for fear that others may find his “dogmatism” unacceptable. If Heathenry is *true*, it is our duty as rational practitioners to uncover *how* it is true; for if its truth lies not in literalism, it must lie in a philosophically grounded theology.

So, having met these initial concerns, the third that is likely to rear its head revolves around the paper’s panentheism. Is it not, the polytheist may ask, simply monotheism in disguise? After all, if panentheism is *true*, why would we deal with the Gods at all; why not directly worship *God* as the Christians do? My response to this comes in the form of an analogy. The cosmic picture that my theological model presents is one of an ordered hierarchy. In social terms a similarly structured hierarchy can be found in a military unit. Let us, for the purposes of this argument identify ourselves—the Heathen population—with an Army’s privates. Let us further identify the daimones with the noncommissioned officers of our company, the Gods with the officers of our battalion, and the metaphysically ultimate Goddess with the commander in chief of the armed forces. Now, as

298 Stephen A. McNallen, “Three Decades of the Ásatrú Revival in America,” *TYR: Myth—Cuture—Tradition* 2 (2003–2004): 217.

299 Collin Cleary, “Paganism Without Gods,” *TYR: Myth—Cuture—Tradition* 3 (2007–2008): 429.

a soldier, around whom do the *vast* majority of your duties and military interactions surround: the NCOs and officers of your unit, or the President of the United States? True, all soldiers are sworn to obey the orders of the President, just as *all* organisms in the cosmos are under the dominion of the Cosmic Goddess' downward causation. However, ninety-nine percent of the time, the President is the furthest thing from a soldier's mind. It is the NCOs who nurture, support and train soldiers. It is the officers who command, guide and lead them. These mid-level tiers of the organizational hierarchy are, due to the simple fact of their ontological *closeness*, incredibly more important to the experience of the individual being considered. In this way, just as the soldier's immediate levels of leadership are not only more important, but also more closely involved in his military life, so are the wights and Gods to the Heathen. Under the emergent model it is not as if the Gods are hypostatic façades of the uppermost Goddess and are utterly contingent upon her. Indeed, quite the opposite is true; the panentheistic deity is herself wholly contingent upon the Gods—a fact which ought alleviate any concerns that this paper's theology slips into the soft polytheism and resultant existence monism of Wicca, Theosophy or Advaita Vedānta.

Fourthly, having mentioned the wights, as this theology somewhat psychologizes the daimones and Gods (by treating them as denizens of the emergent *psuchē* of the individual or group unconscious), where does this leave the *land* wights and the benevolent Jötnar such as Jörð and Sunna without whose interaction our lives would be impossible? Surely *they* cannot be treated as emergent qualities of the human race in the same way the more anthropomorphic Gods can, right? To this concern I would answer with a qualified “yes.” The evolutionary Jungian model presented previously applies strictly to entities who exist *within* the hierarchical continuum that we, ourselves, are a part of. While those beings which exist *without* are parts of branches that we do not participate in. In Heathen terms, this difference is illustrated in the Norse bifurcation between the *innangarð* and the *útangarð*. That is to say that the anthropic continuum, or *innangarð*, is the ring of troth and relatedness that constitutes the various classes of Æsir, Vanir and Jötnar *qua* Gods, while the extra-anthropic continua, or *útangarð*, are the Jötnar, Risar, and Pursar who were never joined in troth with the Gods.

In this way, not only would a *purely* Jungian approach to the telluric and stellar deities of the *útangarð* rob them of their numinosity, it would also be incongruous with the panexperientialist framework within which MacLennan's neurotheology can be seen to rest. We must remember that panexperientialism is a *pan-psychist* philosophy of mind, which grants a degree of mentality and interiority to *all*. That being the case, as mentality and physicality form an organizational duality with the former being a function of the latter's structural complexity, highly organized natural systems such as plants in one's garden, forests, mountain

ranges and up to the Earth herself could not *not* display corresponding mental dimensions. While their completely non-human constitution would necessarily make communication as we think of it as occurring between persons impossible, Whitehead's ontology *would* permit the prehension of this internality by one who specifically sought to do so. Moreover, as the numinous experiencing of the mentality of nature would likely transport the experience to a *religious* frame of reference, it is quite probable that the Jungian projection mechanism would kick in and *overlay* the experience in a mythic symbology proper to the holistic *Weltanschauung* of the Heathen doing the prehending. In this way the gardener who treats his craft as a spiritual practice might literally experience himself working in concert with both the wights of the land and Jörð herself.

Finally, on the *applicability* of this model to the Heathen pantheon, the best answer would be to provide a tentative exploration of how MacLennan's Neoplatonic hierarchy applies to the various denizens of the Heathen cosmos. At the base level, the seething Chaos of the Greeks perhaps finds its best analog with the Norse Ginnungagap: "the primeval void that existed before the creation of the cosmos."³⁰⁰ Skipping forward to the medial layers, we find the lower egoic complexes of the individual unconscious, Iamblichus' archons, to be cognates to the Norse *hugr*, *minni* and *ek*—the mind, memory and ego respectively.³⁰¹ These lower complexes whose primary function is to bind the self to its material base might find themselves best described as the constellation of material wights which comprise Miðgarðr. The higher, superegoic complexes are best represented in the Norse mythos by the personal tutelary spirit: the *fylgja*. The next few layers, those of the complexes of the family and tribal unconscious are likely best paired with the *dísir*, matrones and various household godlings that formed the plenary continuum between the individual and the Gods. This uppermost medial layer, the archetypes of the ethnic unconscious, that of the Gods would of course be filled by the *Æsir*, *Vanir* and select *Jötnar* (with many of these being excluded due to their occupation of extra-human natural hierarchies). Being super-ethnic, the archetypes of the *human* unconscious would, of course have no direct cognates as they are beyond the grasp of a single people's mythology. Skipping upwards once more, the final panentheistic layer is an extremely close fit with the Greek Nyx being a near exact cognate to the Norse Nótt. As the *primary* purpose of this paper was not to specifically map out these cross connections, but rather to develop the framework within which such a thing could be done the above sketch is rather rough around the edges, leaving much room for future clarifica-

300 John Lindow, *Norse Mythology: A Guide to the Gods, Heroes, Rituals and Beliefs*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 141.

301 Edred Thorsson, *Runelore: A Handbook of Esoteric Runology*, (York Beach, ME: Red Wheel/Weiser, LLC, 1987), 169–171.

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tion and expansion. However, a tentative table of correspondences is presented, detailing the connections between the different layers of the emergent hierarchy this essay presents and Heathen theology:

Emergent Neoplatonism	Heathen Theology
The One, as the Panentheistic Pleroma	Nótt
[Ascending Levels of Solar Systemic, Galactic and Universal Hierarchies]	—
The Earth	Jörð
Anthropic Archetypes	—
Ethnic Archetypes	Æsir, Vanir, and (Some) Jötnar
Ethnic Complexes	Einherjar and Valkyrjar
Family Complexes	Disir, Matrones and (Family) Hamingja
Individual Higher Complexes	Vörðr, Fylgja and (Individual) Hamingja
Individual Lower Complexes	Hugr, Minni and Ek
Human Body	Lik
[Ascending Levels of Physical (Sub-Atomic → Atomic → Molecular) and Biotic (Cellular → Organic) Hierarchies]	—
The Many, as the Panexperientialist Prima Materia	Ginnungagap

As this table presents a sketch of the hierarchy within which *we* exist, it necessarily excludes certain categories of wights and Gods which are, nonetheless, of great import in Heathen theology. Some of the *landvættir*, like the rock-dwelling *bergbúi* would find their place between the hierarchical continuum that stretches from the molecular level to Jörð. Others, like the *álfar*, with their connections to the forests and crop fertility would likely emerge from the biotic layer and, again, contribute towards the emanation of Jörð. Certain Jötnar who dwell *outside* of Miðgarðr find themselves part of extraterrestrial emergent hierarchies that diverge from our particular hierarchy at the physical level and only intersect at the level of the solar system (e.g. Sunna and Máni). Others, yet, embody principles

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which are far closer to the root level of Ginnungagap than they are to us; the entropic Hrímpursar of Niflheim and energetic Surtr of Múspell seem to be mythic projections of the kinds of primal processes that affect *all* levels of the hierarchy not by virtue of being metaphysically great, but by means of ontological priority. If, for a moment, we imagine the cosmic hierarchy as Yggdrasil, we can see the ontologically primitive entropic forces curled around the roots in the form of Niðhöggr and the extraordinarily emergent processes of *awareness* and conscious mentality in Veðrfölnir and the unnamed eagle who sit atop the tree.

In closing, it is my great hope that this paper will, above all else, be found to be *useful* by my Heathen brethren. I have done my best to present those of us who are progressively minded in matters of theology with a working platform upon which more in-depth work can be done. Whether you agree or disagree with the thesis put forth, it is my aspiration that your reaction will spur you towards the kind of systematic thought and analysis that went into this paper's construction. After all, as I have said before, Heathendom would be an *awfully* boring place if we all agreed about *everything*. While we will invariably concur on certain *doxa* (e.g. the existence of a plurality of Gods, that among these Gods exist those of the Germanic pantheon, etc.), it is amidst our philosophical disagreements that we, as a community, will find the greatest opportunities for growth and development. May this work serve as a starting point from which further theological debates spring forth. The greatest innovations occur amidst strife, so let me implore you to, in the spirit of dialectic philosophy, "as brothers fight ye!"³⁰²

302 Aleister Crowley, *The Book of the Law: Liber AL vel Legis*, centennial ed., (York Beach, ME: Red Wheel/Weiser, LLC, 2004), III:59.